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ABSTRACT 
 
Chapter 1 replicates and extends Khamis (2009) to provide a detailed analysis of 
informality in the Mexican labor market. The goal is to develop a deeper understanding 
of factors that drive a Mexican worker to join the informal sector. I utilize the Mexican 
Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to test the relationship between informality and gender, 
relationship status, age, place of residence, educational attainment, job type, income, 
firm size, and violence. I find that younger, unmarried women and men with lower 
levels of education living in small rural towns and working in the service sector have 
the highest propensity to work informally. Additionally, formality is concentrated in 
lower income groups and smaller firms and older, married men that are not in non-
service sector jobs tend to work in formal positions regardless of firm size. Finally, I find 
violent assault experience does not have a significant relationship with working the 
informal sector.  
 
Chapter 2 expands empirical literature regarding labor law violation and compliance by 
identifying violation rates for the case of Uruguay. The analysis is then extended using 
a labor market adaptation of Alkire-Foster multidimensional poverty measurement. I 
find that labor law violation has progressively decreased since 2002, laborers who have 
low education, live in rural areas, are black, and work in small firms are more likely to 
face labor violations, and workers are more likely to experience violations in labor 
dimensions outside of minimum wage. These findings open a rich research agenda 
concerning labor law violation rates, enforcement resources, and informality.
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INTRODUCTION 
“Labor markets and employment receive relatively little attention in the literature on 
combating global poverty. In 2000, 189 countries of the United Nations adopted eight 
millennium development goals: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving 
universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; 
reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global 
partnership for development. Employment is not one of the eight, though it is a 
means to many of them.” (Fields 2012).  
 
This thesis consists of two empirical essays on Latin American labor markets. In the first 
chapter, entitled “Determinants of Worker's Propensity to Join the Informal Sector in Mexico,” I 
use individual level data to evaluate the relationship between worker characteristics and 
informality in Mexico. Workers that are not self-employed and receive legally mandated social 
security make up the formal sector and Mexican workers that are not self-employed and don’t 
receive social security make up the informal sector. I use probit models to evaluate how age, 
educational attainment, relationship status, place of residence, job type, experience of violent 
assault, and income affect an individual’s propensity to join the informal sector. In the second 
chapter, entitled “Labor Law Violations in Uruguay,” I use individual level data to conduct a 
multidimensional analysis of labor law violation occurrence in Uruguay. Six labor laws are 
considered: minimum wage, weekly work hours, yearly bonus, social security, vacation time, and 
overtime pay. I measure headcount ratios for all forms of violation and I analyze depth of 
occurrence using the Bhorat et al (2012) method and the Alkire-Foster method (Alkire and Foster 
2011) The results from the two studies contribute to the Mexican, Uruguayan, and Latin 
American empirical labor literatures. 
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Fields (2012) explains that “most of the world’s poor are poor because they work hard but 
their work does not bring in enough income for them to be able to escape poverty.” The 
motivation for this thesis is improving the quality of employment opportunities for poor workers. 
I do not recommend strategies for policy implementation, but I hope to provide information that 
helps policymakers support institutions that incentivize high quality employment. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that differences in economic institutions are the 
fundamental cause of differences in economic development because institutions “shape the 
incentives of key economic actors in society.” Quality of employment hinges on two key 
economic actors: workers and firms. Firms must have the resources to pay competitive wages 
and workers must have capital to perform in competitive positions. The findings on informality 
and labor market violations in this thesis identify disadvantaged workers in Mexico and Uruguay 
that fall outside the ambit of institutional regulation.  
The essays in chapters 1 and 2 are empirical studies that utilize household level surveys. 
Empirical findings are crucial to development economics because policy contexts differ between 
countries (Meier 2005). Development policies based on theory but designed without 
consideration of country context, such as structural adjustment in the 1970’s and 1980’s, are 
ineffective (Schatz 1994). Empirical economics fills the gap between economic theory and 
observed data, helping lawmakers adapt policy to regional contexts. Empirical research in 
development economics has grown considerably in recent decades through expanded data 
availability, introduction of new econometric techniques, and influential publications (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2012). Additionally, empirical analysis is more common and relies on more diverse 
sources of data in labor economics than in economics more generally (Angrist and Krueger 1999).  
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Although chapters 1 and 2 both provide analysis on disadvantaged workers in Latin 
America, they examine different labor market concepts using different methodologies. In 
Chapter 1, I am interested in how certain variables determine an individual’s propensity for 
joining the informal sector, while in Chapter 2, I am interested in measuring occurrence and 
depth of occurrence of labor law violation.  
Chapter 1 is an extension of the work in Khamis (2009), who studies four dimensions of 
informality in the Mexican labor market. She finds that “various legal measures of informality, 
whether the individual is covered by social security or has a written contract in the current job or 
in the previous job, are significantly correlated.” She also runs basic probit models relating 
education level, age, gender, and relationship status to each definition of informality. My 
approach for Chapter 1 is to extend analysis of the probit models for only the legalistic social 
security definition of informality. Chapter 1 relies on econometric techniques and focuses on how 
coefficient values and standard errors change depending on model specification. Instrumental 
variables regression is used to address the endogeneity in the violent assault variable.  
Chapter 2 is a multidimensional analysis of labor law violation. Instead of relying on 
econometric technique, the analysis in chapter two uses two specification methodologies to 
analyze the breadth and depth of labor law violation in Uruguay. The Bhorat et al (2012) 
methodology measures depth of minimum wage violation and the Alkire-Foster methodology 
measures breadth and depth of violation across multiple labor laws. I apply these methodologies 
to various groups of individuals categorized by race, education level, income, and job type to 
compare differences in violation rates. A simple probit model provides correlative evidence, but 
the focus of the chapter is on describing occurrence of labor law violation.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The informal sector is a subset of jobs that can be characterized by lack of administrative 
oversight, ease of entry, small scale of operation, labor-intensiveness, family based operation, 
and low skill (Fields 1990). In the 1970’s, economic researchers considered the informal sector a 
second-choice option with segmented wages strictly lower than the urban formal wage. 
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, qualitative research showed that informal labor markets are 
complex, centrally important elements of Less Developed Country (LDC) economies. Modern 
studies take the perspective that the informal sector consists primarily of lower-quality jobs, but 
can also be a rational and sometimes lucrative option for workers and firms in LDC countries. In 
the words of Maloney, “we should think of the informal sector as the unregulated, developing 
country analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced countries, 
rather than a residual comprised of disadvantaged, workers rationed out of good jobs” (Maloney 
2004).  
Conceptualizing the informal labor market as a dynamic sector allows research to reflect 
the realities of LDC’s more effectively, but also presents empirical and theoretical challenges for 
researchers. The result is a contentious body of literature with disparate and often contradictive 
findings on the definition and economic implications of the informal sector. Empirical labor 
market research is imperative, as it tailors informality to reflect specific features of a country and 
allows researchers to shed light on the conceptual debate.  
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This chapter contributes to informality research by identifying demographic and labor 
market characteristics that affect a Mexican worker’s propensity to join the informal sector. 
Informality is defined using the legalistic definition as suggested by Levy (2008). Three research 
questions are addressed in this study: 
 
1. How does educational attainment, relationship status, geographical location, and job type 
determine propensity to join the informal sector for men and women in Mexico? 
2. Does the relationship between these worker characteristics and informality vary across 
income levels and across firm size? 
3. Is there a relationship between violent assault and participation in the informal market? 
 
Questions 1 and 2 evaluate education, relationship status, geographical location, and job 
type for all Mexican workers and for workers grouped into income and firm size categories. The 
research topics explored in these questions have been addressed in the informality literature 
(Gasparini and Tornaroli 2009; Khamis 2009). These studies will be covered thoroughly in the 
literature review. Based on the informality literature, I expect high educational attainment, 
working age, marriage, urban residence, and white collar jobs to be correlated to formality and 
low educational attainment, single status, rural residence, and service jobs to be correlated to 
informality. On the other hand, the relationship between violence and informality is unexplored 
in the informality literature. Relevant studies relating violent crime to labor marker outcomes is 
discussed in the literature review, along with a discussion of expected results. 
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Literature 
  The purpose of this literature review is to give theoretical and empirical foundation to 
carry out the analysis. The first section clarifies the historical conceptualization of informality and 
contextualizes its theoretical place in modern labor market literature. The second section 
discusses informality in Mexico and the relationship between worker characteristics and 
informality. The insights will help determine the empirical strategy used to create our dependent 
variable and provide a foundation to compare explanatory variable results.  
Informality: Origins, Interpretations, and Relevance 
Origins 
  Informal sector models originate from dualistic labor market models, which distinguish 
between a “formal, modern, or capitalist” sector and an “informal, traditional, or agricultural” 
sector (Fields 2005). For the purposes of this thesis, I will refer to the sectors in dualistic models 
as the “urban” sector and the “rural” sector. The introduction of two sector models was 
important for development research because they aptly describe rural-urban wage segmentation 
and are better at accounting for income differences across the sectors in LDC’s (Lewis 1954; 
Kuznets 1955; Dixit 1973). It is important to note that two-sector theoretical models do not give 
definite prescriptions about labor markets, but are tools researchers use to understand labor 
markets. The Harris-Todaro model (H-T) is a dual-sector framework that revolutionized two-
sector labor market analysis in LDCs and eventually enabled the introduction of an informal 
sector (Harris and Todaro 1970). Fields (2007) qualifies the immense impact of H-T on LDC 
research by identifying two mistakes it helps policymakers avoid: “One is to assume that 
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development efforts should necessarily be channeled to the sectors where the poor are. The 
other is to assume that efforts should necessarily be focused on getting the poor out of the 
sectors in which they now are.” 
The fundamental insight of Harris-Todaro is that urban unemployment increases when an 
abundance of rural workers migrate to the urban sector in search of modern, high-wage jobs 
(Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970). Between 1950 and 1960, demographic shifts were 
happening in the developing world. Rural laborers were migrating to cities and urban labor 
markets were unable to absorb all of the incoming workers. This presented governments of LDC’s 
with a paradox: why do rural workers migrate to urban centers that have high unemployment 
and swell the size of urban slums? To answer this question, Harris and Todaro studied the 
Tripartite Agreement, a Kenyan policy designed to decrease burgeoning unemployment. The 
logic behind the policy was simple: if public and private firms agreed to increase hiring and unions 
agreed to fix wages at the current rate, jobs would be created for unemployed urban workers. 
Instead of decreasing unemployment, the policy caused simultaneous increases in urban 
migration and unemployment. Harris and Todaro justified this outcome by postulating that, in a 
labor market that features a low wage rural sector and a high-fixed-wage urban sector, the 
number of rural workers who migrate to seek higher wages is greater than the number of jobs 
available in the urban sector. The outcome of the Tripartite agreement is justified when this logic 
is applied; adding jobs at a constant wage will incentivize disproportionate migration and cause 
unemployment to grow even higher.  
The key mechanism driving unemployment in the H-T model is wage difference. The 
outcome is migration, which “proceeds in response to urban-rural differences in expected 
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earnings with the urban employment rate acting as the equilibrating force on migration.” In a 
standard two-sector labor market workers will migrate to the higher wage sector until the wages 
converge and laborers are left without incentive to migrate. In this case, the labor market reaches 
equilibrium at a labor market clearing rate. In this standard case, wage dictates incentives and 
unemployment remains in check. H-T reaches equilibrium when rural wage and the expectation 
of urban wage converge:  
 
𝑊𝑟 = 𝑊𝑢𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢
𝑁𝑙𝑓
∗ 𝑊𝑢 
  
𝑊𝑟 = Rural wage; 𝑊𝑢𝑒= Urban Expected Wage; 𝑊𝑢= Urban Wage 
𝑁𝑒𝑚𝑝= laborers employed in the urban sector; 𝑁𝑙𝑓= urban labor force 
 
A summary of the model is offered in the Harris-Todaro paper: “the [rural and urban] sectors are 
intimately connected through labor migration. If one additional job is created in the [urban] 
sector at the minimum wage, the expected wage will rise and rural-urban migration will be 
induced.”  
Studies published shortly after H-T argued that urban jobs outside of the minimum wage 
urban sector existed (Lopez 1970) and the concept of an informal sector that is comprised of 
these jobs was introduced to the literature by Keith Hart (1972). Fields established the informal 
sector formally by incorporating a secondary market for workers unable to find urban sector jobs, 
which he called a “murky” sector, that featured  the following attributes: free entry, income-
sharing, and on-the-job search opportunities. The third attribute is a key mechanism that 
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incentivizes workers to remain in the urban sector. Workers explore other employment options 
and many end up “underemployed.” If workers can participate in the informal sector and 
continue to search for formal jobs with a reasonable probability of success, workers have 
additional reason to remain in urban areas. Under Field’s specification, a new equilibrium 
condition is reached that allows for both formal and informal jobs to be available to urban 
migrants: 
  
𝑊𝑟 =𝑊𝑢𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢
𝑁𝑙𝑓
∗ 𝑊𝑢 +
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑙𝑓
∗ 𝑊𝑖 
 
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, informality in the labor market was primarily analyzed 
through this lens and this “urban informal sector.” 
Interpretations 
 The urban informal sector took an important role in development and labor market 
research soon after its introduction. Economists understood that rural people migrate to urban 
areas for formal work and stay in urban areas even if they cannot find a formal sector job. Those 
who stay are forced to make a living in the urban informal sector as they search for formal work. 
This interpretation was theoretically convenient, but many critics noted that it fails to reflect the 
job market realities in developing countries (Hart 1973; Bienefeld and Godfrey 1975). In a pointed 
critique, Peattie (1987) sums up the disconnect between development research and the concept 
of informality: “The ‘informal sector,’ however defined, is not necessarily a category within which 
to locate the poor. There are well-to-do petty entrepreneurs, and workers underpaid by large 
enterprise… This idea is at least debatable and I believe should be debated, rather than 
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incorporated into our thinking by looking at poverty only within very small firms and by looking 
at only poor small-scale producers and entrepreneurs.” Assuming a homogenous and undesirable 
alternative to the formal sector was no longer enough; for informality research to be relevant to 
public policy, the scope of the urban informal sector had to be expanded. 
In response, Fields (1990) revisits the 1975 paper and incorporated the criticisms, pushing 
urban informal market analysis into its modern form. The key criticism Fields (1990) cites is from 
Tokman (1988), who explains that differentiation is an important feature of the informal sector, 
as some workers come into the informal sector with capital endowments and work jobs that have 
barriers to entry. Fields steps away from the urban informal sector definition and concludes a 
non-homogenous informal labor market is more suitable. His revelation prompted the modern 
informality research agenda, where economists seek to understand a dynamic informal sector 
that is not exclusively suboptimal, varies depending on the economy being studied, and 
comprises an important and often persistent part of developing economy labor markets. 
A dynamic informal sector is advantageous over a wage-segmented “urban informal 
sector” because it more closely represents economic reality, but conceptual ambiguity has led to 
divergent and contradictory ideologies within the literature. Once again, Peattie (1987) explains: 
“Since [informality] is so impossible to define, it is naturally impossible to bound in a real world 
where data is to be gathered… it is by definition going to be rather out of the reach of 
measurement.” Peattie’s criticism foresaw the challenges faced by economists to measure 
informality. Definitions used in mainstream labor literature can be grouped into two categories: 
productive and legalistic. Khamis (2009) discusses both and finds correlations between the 
definitions in the Mexican labor market. She also defines dependent variables using both 
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definitions and finds similarity in worker characteristics across the definitions.  In this thesis, I 
focus specifically on the legalistic definition because of empirical implications and relevance to 
the Mexican context. Since the legalistic measurement strategy is closely tied to government 
institutions, policy conclusions, often revolving around regulation and enforcement of labor law, 
are more applicable than they are under the abstract productivity definition. Kanbur (2009) 
emphasizes the role of enforcement within the legalistic definition, explaining that firms, on the 
supply-side of labor, have four possible reactions to the legal enforcement of a labor law: 
compliance within the ambit of regulation, non-compliance within the ambit of regulation, exit 
the ambit of regulation, and never entering the ambit in the first place. Our paper takes the 
perspective of the worker, the demand-side of the labor market. Using Kanbur’s framework, 
Mexican workers operate in a labor market where jobs can be formal or informal in various firm 
styles and can receive livable wages outside of the regulatory structure.  
Informality and Poverty 
 Despite conceptual ambiguity surrounding informality, there is consensus that this large, 
semi-legal, urban, and underproductive workforce exists in many developing countries and is 
closely tied to urban poverty (Sethuraman 1981, 1997; Maloney 2004). Informality research is 
important because it provides insight for governments, development agencies, and non-profits 
that seek to eradicate poverty through development of labor markets. Studies relating poverty 
to informality focuses on income inequality, social protection, and migration. Although research 
shows the informal sector is not segmented and wages in the informal and formal sector do 
overlap, formal jobs are more likely to be a direct path out of poverty in most countries 
(Maloney 1999; Arias and Khamis 2007; Bargain and Kwenda 2010). Formal work, defined by 
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the legalistic view, provides access to social support programs, stable employee-employer 
relationships, and opportunities to accumulate capital in the form of labor. Additionally, 
formalization helps governments expand the tax base and social programs.  
Wage heterogeneity between the formal and informal sectors adds difficulty when 
trying to identify a relationship between informality and poverty. As Maloney (2004) suggests, 
it is societally advantageous to support certain firms and laborers that operate in the informal 
sector so they can eventually enter the formal sector. Observing worker characteristics that 
raise or lower propensity to join the informal sector offers an alternative method to wage for 
differentiating between the formal and informal sectors.  
Informality and its Determinants 
 Theoretical informality research from the previous section is complemented by a review 
of empirical literature in two sections. First, literature that defines the Mexican informal worker 
will help construct the dependent variable for the econometric models. Second, a review of 
studies on the inverse relationship between informality and worker characteristics, with 
particular attention given to Mexico and Latin America, will provide a baseline for comparison 
of results. 
Mexican Context 
Levy (2008) offers strategies for measuring the Mexican informal sector and studies the 
impact of social programs on labor segmentation. This study will use Levy (2008) as a guideline 
to measure the Mexican informal sector. Accordingly, this section of the literature review 
presents Levy’s specification of the Mexican informal sector, along with alternative definitions, 
to form an initial identification strategy for measuring the informal sector.  
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Levy (2008) defines formal Mexican workers using the legalistic definition as “salaried 
workers employed by a firm that registers them with IMSS.” The Mexican Social Security institute 
(IMSS) is Mexico’s social security bundle that includes health insurance, disability insurance, 
work-risk insurance, life insurance, day care for worker’s children, sports and cultural facilities, 
retirement pensions, and housing loans. Employees that receive Mexican law states that social 
security is the right of the salaried employee and firms are required to provide IMSS for salaried 
employment. Employees that receive social security from the Institute for Social Security and 
Services for State Workers (ISSSTE) are also counted as formal workers. ISSSTE is the government 
equivalent of IMSS. 
An important distinction is that Levy does not claim this is the correct definition of 
informality and agrees with the idea that there is no uniform definition of the informal market  
(Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2006). Informality describes a dichotomy and the 
definition of informality depends on the constraints of that labor market. Levy suggests that using 
IMSS to define legalistic informality is most appropriate “in the sense of being driven by the 
country’s laws and institutions pertaining to the labor market.” Other definitions for the Mexican 
informal sector include the productivity and legalistic definitions used in Khamis (2009). She finds 
strong correlations between the different informality definitions and similarities between the 
definitions in terms of their relationship with worker characteristics. Alternative definitions are 
not considered in this thesis. 
Relevant Variables 
The final section of the literature review addresses the relationships between worker 
characteristics and the informal sector. Generally, informality studies find that Mexico has a large 
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and highly heterogenous informal labor market that has gradually decreased in size since the 
Mexican credit crisis.  
Gasparini and Tornaroli (2009) conduct a comparative study of informality across Latin 
America. For the case of Mexico, they use Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos (ENIGH) 
between 1992 and 2002 and classify Mexican workers as informal if they have a pension when 
retired. The authors show that informal workers in Mexico comprise over half of the labor market 
and are correlated with lower levels of education, older and younger age groups, and 
employment in small firms. Mexico is one of two Latin American countries that experience an 
overall decrease in informality between 1990 and 2002, but is similar to other Latin American 
countries in terms of worker characteristics associated with informality.  
Workers with low levels of education have higher propensities to join the informal sector 
in developing economies (Maloney 2004; Gasparini and Tornaroli 2009; Herrera-Idarraga 2016) 
and in Mexico (Maloney 1999). This result coincides with studies that show the informal sector 
is occupied by a large proportion of low-skill, low-income workers, as these workers tend to have 
lower levels of education. Workers with high educational attainment are more likely to avoid the 
informal sector because they can compete for high-wage jobs in the formal sector. Gunther 
(2006) uses Ivorian data to show that the formal and informal sectors overlap not only in terms 
of wage, but also exists in terms of educational attainment. This shows that “upper tier” jobs in 
the informal sector offer higher wages, but also require initial levels of human capital to acquire 
the job. The consensus in this area of research is that education is correlated with formality 
status, but there is no exclusivity in terms of education attainment in the informal sector. This 
study analyzes how educational attainment changes propensity to join the informal sector and 
 15 
 
contributes to the literature by describing this relationship for Mexico and exploring the depth 
of overlap in educational attainment between the formal and informal sectors.  
The relationship between violent crime and informality is not addressed in labor market 
literature. Depending on how this relationship is framed, different outcomes can be justified. For 
example, formal individuals may be more likely to experience a violent crime because formal jobs 
tend to be offered in urban areas, where both formal jobs and violent crimes are more common. 
Additionally, violent crime experiences may incentivize individuals to make more conservative 
decisions, such as acquiring a formal job that offers social security. On the other hand, individuals 
in the informal sector tend to be poorer than those in the formal sector and likely are unable to 
afford safe neighborhoods, exposing them to crime. My motivation is to find evidence of a 
relationship between violent crime and informality in Mexico, a country with  relatively high 
violence rates strongly correlated to escalating drug activity (Verdugo-Yepes, Pedroni, and Hu 
2015). To conduct the analysis, I take advantage of individual victimization data provided in the 
MxFLS surveys. 
The labor market literature links violent crime to a reduction in work, reduction in 
consumption, and reduction in educational attainment (Lloyd 1997; Freeman 1991).  BenYishay 
et al (2013) study the impact of increasing homicide rates on labor force participation in Mexico. 
The authors use a fixed effects model with instrumental variables to show that victims of violent 
crime work see a 1-2% reduction in hours worked and an increase of 10 homicides per 100,000 
over a one year leads to an average decline of approximately 0.29 hours worked per week among 
all individuals. There is no research on the consequences of violence on employment decisions 
in Mexico or elsewhere, but based on the findings in BenYishay et al (2013), I expect experience 
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of violent crime to be associated with lower rates of informality. It is important to note that Levitt 
(1997) addresses endogeneities in the relationship between crime and police presence. I address 
endogeneity in the relationship between violent crime and informality with an instrumental 
variable regression.   
Data and Methodology 
Data     
The data for this study comes from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), which was 
collected in three series (MxFLS-1, MxFLS-2, and MxFLS-3) and is jointly managed by 
Iberoamerican University (UIA), the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE), and Duke 
University. The MxFLS is a nationally representative survey and includes specific information at 
both national and regional levels. It is a longitudinal panel that follows individuals over time. Each 
series contains detailed statistics regarding topics such as education, employment, income 
sources, health, and crime, as well as other descriptive characteristics on an individual and 
household basis. The data also incorporates detailed information covering various features of the 
labor market. 
This study extends the data used in Khamis (2009) by including all 3 MxFLS datasets, changing 
data specifications on three variables used in Khamis (2009), and incorporating new variables. 
While leveraging all three datasets adds breadth, it is important to note differences between the 
survey editions that limit the study. MxFLS-1 was conducted entirely in 2002, MxFLS-2 started in 
2005 and ended in 2006, and MxFLS-3 started in 2009 and ended in 2012. The MxFLS website 
cites the re-contact process as the main source of time lag for the MxFLS-2 and MxFLS-3 series. 
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Additionally, the surveys allow for changes in household composition. If a new member joins a 
household, she or he is added to the dataset. The two changes can cause correlations within 
groups of individuals with similar response times and correlations within the group of individuals 
that are added. I do not attempt to measure the impact of these limitations. Analyses using 
MxFLS-2 and MxFLS-3 will treat the surveys as representative of the conduction time span instead 
of a specific year.   
The formal sector in Khamis (2009) is defined as non-agriculture workers that receive IMSS 
and the informal sector as non-agriculture workers that do not receive IMSS. The specification 
used in this study is changed to exclude workers that earn ISSSTE, the public-sector equivalent of 
IMSS, from the informal labor market. The social security dimension of informality used in this 
paper defines the formal sector as non-agricultural workers that receive either IMSS or ISSSTE 
and the informal sector as non-agriculture workers that do not receive IMSS or ISSSTE. 
Observations considered informal under the original specification shift to the formal sector under 
the new definition. 
The explanatory variables used in this study comprise of the variables in Khamis (2009) 
(gender, household heads, relationship status, state of residence, age, and education level) and 
new variables (urban or rural residence, victimization rates, and job type). As mentioned in the 
literature review, the new variables have not been included in previous studies. Additionally, the 
informality, education, and job sector variables are defined with new methodology. Changes to 
Khamis’ original specifications were possible thanks to the author, who kindly shared her data 
creation process.  
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The education variable is changed to account for final year of schooling completed and to 
include two new education categories. Khamis (2009) assigns individuals one of four education 
categories: No education, Primary education, Secondary education, and Tertiary education. These 
categories represent the final level of education attended by an individual. Therefore, someone 
that completed high school would be assigned to the same education category as someone who 
failed to complete the first year of high school. This study uses five education categories: Less 
than Elementary, Elementary, Middle School, High School, and Tertiary. The categories represent 
the highest level of education completed by an individual, instead of highest level of education 
attended. Middle and High School combine to form the Secondary category in the original 
specification. Middle includes individuals who completed up to middle school (9th grade) and the 
High School includes individuals who completed all 12 years of secondary school. The third and 
final difference is a change in the categorical job sector variable that defines it using the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia’s (INEGI) Mexican Classification of Occupations. This keeps 
consistency between all three years of data, as the 2009 survey only provides the Mexican 
system.  
Three new variables are introduced to this study: urban, assault, and firm size. Urban is an 
indicator variable that assigns individuals as urban or rural residents based on the specification 
used in Haisken-DeNew and Michaelson (2011). An individual is considered rural if he or she lives 
in a town with a population of less than 12,500. Assault is an indicator variable that measures if 
an individual has ever experienced violent assault. The survey question used to create assault 
changes from “have you ever experienced violent assault?” in  MxFLS-1 to “have you experienced 
violent assault in the past 5 years in?” MxFLS-2 and MxFLS-3. Therefore, assault can only be used 
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with MxFLS-1. Firm size is a collection of four indicator variables that account for the number of 
coworkers at an individual’s firm. Finally, an income variable is used to stratify models in Table 7. 
The three income group variables stratify individuals into lower, middle, and upper third of 
income earners depending on the individual’s income. Income value calculation considers both 
take home pay and monetary value of alternative compensation 
Methodology     
Propensity to join the informal sector is examined using a probit model, which is estimated 
using least squares. The dependent variable for all models in this paper takes a binary value, 1 if 
the individual is formal and 0 if the individual is informal. The explanatory variables can be binary 
or continuous. Correlation between the dependent and an explanatory variable implies that, 
when the explanatory variable changes in value, the probability that the dependent variable is 1 
increases or decreases. The probit model was selected over its comparable alternative, logit. 
Differences between probit and logit models lie in the distribution of error terms and the link 
function used to calculate probability. Logit models assume standard logistic distribution of the 
errors, whereas probit models assume errors are normally distributed. Probit link functions 
model random effects with large medium to large datasets more efficiently and logit link 
functions perform better in the case of extreme independent variables(Hahn and Soyer 2005). 
Because there is no reason to assume non-normal errors, there are no extreme independent 
variables, and the MxFLS data is relatively large, the probit model is best suited for estimation of 
propensity to join the informal sector. The basic specification is as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑖 + 𝛿𝑏𝑔𝑦𝑏𝑔𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  
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Individual i receives a value of 𝑥𝑎𝑖for variable a and the coefficient estimate for variable a is 𝛽𝑎. 
𝛿𝑏𝑔represents the group variable, where b identifies the group, either education or job type, and 
b identifies the variables within the group. Individuals are assigned value 𝑦𝑏𝑔𝑖  for only one of t 
variables in 𝛿𝑏𝑔 . In the extensions section, this same framework is applied to different partitions 
of data. For the income extension, the model is applied to the lowest, middle, and upper tiers of 
income and for the firm size extensions, the model is applied to small, medium, and large firm 
workers. The instrumental variable methodology is elaborated in the violence extension. 
Summary Stats  
  Summary statistics covering the variables of interest are presented in the appendix for all 
three versions of the MxFLS survey. Variable means and observations for the employed non -
agricultural labor force, the subset of formal laborers, and the subset of informal laborers are 
provided along with results from difference in means tests between the informal and formal 
subset. Analysis of the summary tables helps frame the analysis and understand limitations 
presented by the datasets.  
There are more informal workers than there are formal workers in all three MxFLS versions. 
The difference diminishes over time. In MxFLS-1, 32.5 % of workers are considered formal, 
compared to 35.4% in MxFLS-2 and 40.2% in MxFLS-3. IMSS and ISSSTE enrollment rates between 
2002 and 2012, as reported by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI), fluctuate 
around 50% of the Mexican population.1 INEGI uses the entire Mexican population to calculate 
                                                             
1 Based on author’s calculations using INEGI website 
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enrollment figures, whereas the population for this study is comprised of only the employed non-
agricultural workforce. The larger total enrollment rates reported by INEGI can be attributed to 
dependents, who receive social security but are not part of the employed workforce. The 
enrollment growth discrepancy is less discernable. Demographic shifts, such as a relative 
decrease in total offspring among formal workers compared to informal workers, can explain 
how the employed workforce could see increasing social security enrollment rates while the 
general population retains constant enrollment rates. MxFLS survey technique and population 
changes could also account for the discrepancy. For the purposes of this study, informality 
decreased (social security enrollment rates among employed non-agricultural workers increased) 
between MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-3. 
Female workers consistently make up about 38 % of the non-agriculture employed workforce. 
No significant difference exists between the proportion of women in the informal sector and the 
proportion of women in the formal sector in any of the survey editions. In this data, women 
participate in the informal sector at a lower rate than men, although differences may exist within 
subsets of the female workforce. Household head fall from 44.3% of the labor force in MxFLS-1 
to 37.6% of the labor force in MxFLS-3. The mean for household head in MxFLS-3 is 40.2% if only 
original survey subjects are considered, which shows that the steepness of the decrease can 
partly be attributed to the nature of the dataset. For example, a household with three school 
aged children in 2002 may become a household with three young workers between 2009 and 
2012. This would add disproportionate amount of non-household head workers to the labor force 
subsample I created. Additionally, if a household member that was considered dependent in 
MxFLS-1 becomes head of a new household at the time of MxFLS-3, all members of the new 
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household are included in the survey. Again, a disproportionate amount of non-household head 
workers could populate the subsample.  
All three survey years show a significantly larger proportion of household heads in the formal 
sector than the informal sector. The difference is reasonable because social security coverage 
applies to partners and dependents, making the value of a job that offers social security higher 
to a household head than a non-household head. Non-household heads have less incentive to 
find a job that provides social security if the household head already provides social security 
coverage for the household. Around 45% of married workers participate in the formal sector with 
little difference between the survey editions. All three surveys show that a significantly higher 
proportion of married workers participate in the formal sector than the informal sector. The 
difference could be attributed to age and household head status, as married workers are more 
likely to be older and heads of household than unmarried workers. There are other dimensions 
of this difference, such as the previously stated argument that marriage could grant a previously 
uncovered worker social security through a spouse, de-incentivizing the married person to join 
the formal sector.  
An individual is considered non-urban if he or she lives in a community with a population of 
12,500 or less. 72.3% and 72.9% of non-agricultural workers lived in urban areas in 2002 and 
2005, but the proportion drops to 62.7% of non-agricultural workers in the MxFLS-3 data. A 
potential reason behind this steep decrease is migration. If firms in rural areas expanded hir ing, 
the relatively large number of jobs could attract workers. Alternatively, and possibly more 
plausible, explanations for the decrease include higher response rates among individuals in rural 
areas or demographic shifts among age groups, such as older workers choosing less stressful rural 
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residences as they edge closer to retirement. Difference in means tests show that a significantly 
larger proportion of informal workers live in rural areas. 17.1% of individuals in MxFLS-1 
experienced a violent assault and 11.2% of individuals experienced a violent assault in MxFLS-2. 
Formal workers were significantly more likely to experience a violent assault than informal 
workers in both surveys. Reasons behind this difference are ambiguous and will be explored in 
the results section.  
Age and income are continuous variables and education and job type are categorical 
variables. All four are presented as groups of dummy variables in the summary statistics chart 
and only age is used in its original form in the probit models. For these grouped variables, 
individuals receive a 1 value if they belong to a subcategory within a group and can belong to 
only one subcategory. The informal workforce is concentrated in the lower age categories, while 
the formal workforce is concentrated in the middle age categories. Informal and formal workers 
at the end of their careers to not show significant means. Differences in education levels between 
formal and informal workers tend to exist at the lower and higher education levels. There is no 
significant difference in means between workers who have completed middle school. Income is 
grouped into three quantiles, so the groups are relatively similar in size. Informal workers are 
concentrated in the lower and middle income quantiles, while formal workers make up an 
overwhelming majority of the upper income quantile. The differences in income shown in the 
summary statistics charts are in accordance with the income differences suggested in the 
literature. Finally, Informal workers tend to be concentrated in firms of 5 employees or less, while 
formal workers are concentrated in larger firms. 60% of workers belong to small firms, while only 
11% of workers belong to firms with 51 or more employees. There is a substantial inconsistency 
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between the job type variables in MxFLS-3 and the job type variables in MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2. 
Data documentation from the MxFLS website shows that over 2,000 additional workers are 
included in the “administrative” and “office professional” job categories, both corresponding to 
the white collar subset of job type. I am unsure why this discrepancy exists, but it does not results 
comparison of job type between MxFLS-3 and the other surveys. In MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2, mean 
of blue collar workers is not different between formal and informal, while white collar has a larger 
proportion of formal workers and service has a larger proportion of informal workers.  
Results 
Results from the empirical analysis are presented in three sections. A three-step extension of 
Khamis for all three versions of the MxFLS survey is carried out to develop the final model.     
Replication  
Table 4 displays results from the social security dimension probit model in Khamis (2009) 
alongside replications of the Khamis model for all three series of the MxFLS. data for the 
replications uses adjusted formality and sector variables. Replication 2005 further reinforces the 
Khamis 2005 results by decreasing standard errors and finding similar and marginally more 
precise coefficient values. Changes occur from reassignment of government social security 
earners from the informal sector to the formal sector in the adjusted data. Standard errors 
improve because the dependent variable in the new dataset is defined with more precision. The 
effect of elementary is dampened because most the newly formal government workers have 
above elementary education and the effect of tertiary increases because many of the 
government workers have college or graduate level degrees. Government workers are likely to 
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be more capable than the average worker, so the effect of ability increases as well. The 2002 and 
2009 replications also reinforce the findings in Khamis (2009) with minor differences. In the 2002 
model, relationship status has no discernable effect while being the head of household is 
correlated with formal sector participation.  In the 2009 model, single workers are likely to be in 
the informal sector and elementary has no discernible effect while the coefficient on tertiary 
increases significantly. Results from this replication exercise strengthen the findings in Khamis 
(2009) and prompt the proceeding extensions.     
Extension 
  Three groups of three models, one group for each MxFLS survey, are presented in Table 5 of 
the appendix. The models Model A, Model B, and Model C are steps in the process of transforming 
the probit model in Khamis (2009) into the final model for this study. The final model is presented 
in Table 6.  
Model A 
  In Model A variables for ability, single, and divorced are removed, variable age squared is 
added, and education is controlled for with the redefined set of indicator variables. Khamis (2009) 
uses a continuous variable to account for age and the result can be interpreted as each additional 
year of life marginally raises propensity to join the formal sector. Summary tables 1 – 3 show that 
the youngest and oldest age subgroups to be most susceptible to being part of the informal 
sector, meaning the relationship between an additional year of life and formality for a 50-year-
old worker should be negative. The age squared variable captures concentration of informality 
at the tails of the age distribution; propensity to be formal increases more each additional year 
due to the higher coefficient value on age, but the negative effect of agesq become more severe 
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with age. Variables single and divorced are removed because they lack a relationship with 
informality, leaving Married as the sole significant relationship statues variable.  
The education variables in Model A utilize the specifications described in the data section. 
The base variable is middle because workers that completed middle school comprise the largest 
education group (35.8% in MxFLS-2). Across all three editions, the Less Than and Elementary 
variables have negative coefficients and are highly significant. Workers that do not complete 
elementary school are least likely to acquire a formal sector job; completion of elementary 
school raises this likelihood significantly. The difference in coefficient value between Less than 
and Elementary is larger in both MxFLS 1 and 2 than it is in MxFLS-3. High School is positive and 
significant across all three models and the coefficient increases in value for each consecutive 
MxFLS edition. A worker that completes high school is more likely to join the formal sector than 
a worker who only completes middle school. Interestingly, the College variable has an 
ambiguous effect in MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2. This could be the result of informal jobs that require 
skills and pay well, but avoid regulation. High income earners with college education may also 
be avoiding government sanctioned social security in favor of private insurance that provides 
better coverage. It is important to note that the education variables are endogenous in this 
model. Educational attainment is often correlated with unobserved variation in the error term, 
such as skill, income, and access to education. This paper is not focused on addressing these 
endogeneities.  
Model B 
  In Model B, the variable urban is introduced to account for rural-urban differences and the 
state control is changed from a continuous variable to a set of indicator variables. Urban is 
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positive and highly significant in all three editions of the MxFLS, suggesting workers in rural areas 
are more likely to participate in the informal sector than workers in urban areas. In addition to 
differences discussed in the summary statistics section, there is a body of literature relating lack 
of enforcement infrastructure to increased labor law violation (Kanbur 2009). Stricter 
enforcement of social security law in urban areas is a potential differentiating factor.  
Controlling for rural-urban differences addresses bias in other explanatory variables. For 
example, coefficient estimates for Less than and Elementary become more positive when urban 
is included because Less than and Elementary capture the effect from disproportionate 
informality rates among rural workers with low levels of education. To clarify, Graph 1 shows the 
distribution of workers across education level and formality status. In the “Informal” section, the 
Less than Elementary and Elementary bars are much larger for rural workers than they are for 
urban workers. When we don’t control for urban residence, the negative effect of living in a rural 
area is captured by the less Less than and Elementary variables because rural residence and low 
levels of education are strongly correlated. It is important to note that Table 5 shows that Less 
Figure 1 
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than and Elementary become more negative in the Model B specification, but this decrease is 
caused by changing methodology for the state control.  
 The variable controlling for state of residence is changed from a continuous variable to 
dummy variables for each state to allow for more specific control of between-state differences. 
The results are not included in the model because one-by-one discussion of the coefficients and 
standard errors for these indicator variables would be cumbersome and unnecessary. Figure 2 
displays two vertical bars for each state, one representing the portion of the labor force that is 
informal and the other representing the portion of the labor force that is formal. As mentioned 
in the summary statistics, there are more informal workers than formal workers and the 
difference diminishes over the survey periods. Interestingly, not all states see an increase in the 
relative size of the formal sector. The regions Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Durango, Jalisco, 
Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Sonora, y Yucatan see significant increases in proportion of formal workers, 
while other states see smaller increases and Morelos and Guanajuato see small decreases in 
proportion of formal workers. The indicator variable method is advantageous because each state 
variable captures the difference between portion of workers that are formal and informal for the 
state in question. Under a continuous specification, the effects are grouped into one variable and 
many observable differences are left in the error term. An example of improved outcome caused 
by state control dummies is the increase in coefficient value on High School from .216 to .276 in 
MxFLS-2. In Model A, endogeneity occurs in High School because there is correlation between  
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High School and state trends in the error term. A plausible explanation is that formal job 
opportunities are less common in certain states and, by controlling for state with a continuous 
variable, the model fails to capture the negative effect of living in one of these “low opportunity” 
states. This negative effect is unobserved and incorporated into the error term. If the “low 
opportunity” states have a sizable portion of high school graduates working in the informal 
sector, the coefficient value on High School decreases. Once the individual state variables are 
added, the negative effect of living in a “low opportunity” state is captured in the indicator 
variables and the coefficient on High School increases as it is no longer confounded with 
individual state effects in the error term.     
Model C 
In Model C, displayed with marginal effects in Table 6, an interaction term is created from 
variables married and female and the sector control variable is changed from a continuous 
variable to a set of three indicator variables representing white collar, blue collar, and service 
jobs. The summary statistics section showed no difference in informality rate means between 
men and women and showed married individuals to have lower mean informality than unmarried 
individuals. Since most marriages are between men and women, including a variable that 
interacts married and female allows for analysis of gender differences within unmarried 
individuals and within married individuals. In MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2, the coefficient value for 
female is small and insignificant, suggesting that there no gender differences in job formality 
between single men and women. MxFLS-3 shows a different and particularly interesting result. 
The coefficient on female is negative and significant in Model B, but is positive and significant in 
Model C. Therefore, in MxFLS-3, women generally have higher propensities to join the informal  
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sector than men, but single women are more likely to be formal than single men. In the subset 
of married individuals, men receive a “1” value for married and a “0” value for female and 
femxmar and women receive a “1” value for married, female, and femxmar. For both MxFLS-1 
and MxFLS-3, Model C shows strong evidence that married women are more likely to join the 
informal sector than married men and for MxFLS-2 evidence of this difference is present but 
weaker. In MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-3, married has a positive and significant coefficient. This suggests 
married men are less likely to work in the informal sector than unmarried men and women. On  
the other hand, the coefficient on femxvar negative and significant implying that married women 
are more likely to work in the informal sector than married men. Since the coefficient value on 
femxvar is also larger in magnitude than the coefficient on married, the Model C also provides 
evidence that married women are more likely to join the informal sector than single men and 
women. Model C for MxFLS-2 provides weaker evidence that formality difference between 
married men and married women exist because the coefficient on femxvar is negative but is not 
significant at the 90% level or higher. Because standard error on femxvar is relatively small and 
the coefficient is significant at the 85% level, this evidence is considered weak instead of 
insignificant. 
Lastly, the sector variable is changed to a series of three indicator variables that place 
individuals into one of the three job categories: Blue Collar, White Collar, and Service. The 
motivation behind this change is similar to the motivation behind the change in state variable; 
using indicator variable groups allows for more specific identification of between-sector 
differences. Additionally, the coefficients and standard errors for the sector indicator variables 
have relevant interpretations. Before interpreting results, it is important to recall that MxFLS-3 
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includes a much larger proportion of white collar workers than the MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2. This 
data methodology difference makes analysis between the three surveys more difficult. The base 
variable for job sector is Blue Collar because, in MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2, Blue Collar contains the 
highest proportion of workers. In MxFLS-1, individuals that work in the service sector are more 
likely to participate in the informal sector than individuals working in the white collar or blue 
collar sectors. There is no significant difference in formality propensity between white collar and 
blue collar workers. In MxFLS-2, white collar workers are significantly more likely to operate in 
the formal sector than blue collar and service workers and there is no significant different in 
formality propensity between blue collar and service workers. In both survey editions, white 
collar workers have lower propensities to be informal than service workers, while the propensity 
for blue collar workers to be formal has different relative effects depending on survey edition. In 
MxFLS-3, both service workers and white collar workers are more likely to participate in the 
informal sector. The results show that service workers operate in the informal second twice as 
much as white collar workers. The extremity in these results can be attributes to data  
specification differences between the survey years. The overall conclusion from the results 
section is that younger, unmarried men and married women with lower levels of education living 
in small rural towns and working in the service sector have the highest propensity to work 
informally. Additionally, older women and men, high school graduates, and urban residents are 
more likely to be in the formal sector. 
Additional Specifications 
The outcomes from the results sections add explanatory power to the original Khamis (2009) 
probit model. Using the final model as a foundation, this section will present three extensions to 
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further explore informality in the Mexican labor market. First, I will analyze the influence of 
violent assault experiences and participation in cash transfer programs on informality using 
additional variables and an instrumental variable identification. Second, the role of income will 
be analyzed by running the final model using data that is stratified by income level. Finally, I will 
introduce variables accounting for firm size to the final model.  
Income  
Heterogenous wage segmentation is a elementary feature of informality in developing 
economies. This means that the informal labor market does not have a uniformly lower wage 
than the formal labor market. Graph 3 shows the differences in wage distribution of wages 
between the formal and informal sector. It is important to note that, although wages in the 
formal and informal sector overlap, formal wages skew significantly higher than informal wages. 
15% of informal workers that earn no wage or far below minimum wage, while almost 15% of 
formal workers are at the highest income quantile.  
Table 7 displays the final model over lower, middle, and upper income level quantiles for 
MxFLS-1, MxFLS-2, and MxFLS-3. Correlations between characteristics and propensity to join the 
formal sector display consistencies and inconsistencies at different income levels and survey 
editions. Across the three survey editions, coefficients on age tend to decrease in value and 
significance as income level increases, coefficients on lower educational attainment are negative 
and significant at almost all income levels, and coefficient values on household head are 
insignificant at all income levels. Older age is more likely to raise propensity to be formal among 
lower income people than it is among higher income people. Younger workers have less time to 
build capital in the labor force and are less likely to find formal work. Young workers that enter 
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the workforce at higher levels of income have high education attainment to substitute lack of 
experience. This effect could equate formality status among wealthier individuals at different 
ages. Workers with less than elementary education see large and significant trends to informality. 
Completing elementary school makes workers more likely to join the formal sector than 
completing less than elementary, although the magnitude of the effect depends on the survey 
edition. Lower income people with elementary education in MxFLS-3 are only slightly less 
correlated with the informal sector than low income people with less than elementary education, 
while the opposite is true in MxFLS-1. Lastly, coefficients for the household head variable are 
insignificant across income level and survey edition. 
The inconsistencies reveal characteristics that differentiate formality trends among lower, 
middle, and upper income workers. Unmarried women have significantly higher propensities to 
be formal than unmarried men in the middle and upper echelons of the income distribution, but 
Figure 3 
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there is little differentiation at the lower end of the income distribution. Young women earning 
low wages in the informal sector tend to work in domestic service, which might equate their 
average formality status to that of men at the lower income levels. At the middle and upper levels 
of income, this effect is muted because domestic jobs cease to exist. Relationship status varies 
widely in its effect across income and relationship status. For example, married women are more 
likely to be in the informal sector than unmarried women and married men at the middle-income 
level in MxFLS-1 and the lower income level in MxFLS-2, while they have lower propensities that 
unmarried women in the upper income levels in MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-3. The conclusion from 
relationship status is ambiguous. Data inconsistencies for the job type variables in MxFLS-3 inhibit 
comparisons and income level inconsistencies between MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2 are ambiguous as 
well. 
Firm Size 
  Table 8 displays the final model segmented by firm size for MxFLS-1, MxFLS-2, and MxFLS-
3. We account for firm size by segmentation rather than inclusion of a firm size variable because 
strong endogeneities exist between firm size and our definition of formality. Firm size is a feature 
of informality under the productivity definition and Khamis (2009) shows that there are strong 
correlations between legalistic and productivity definitions. In other words, larger firms are likely 
to offer social security, while small firms are more likely to employ workers without offering social 
security. Including a firm size variable in this model would cause a reverse causality between firm 
size and formality, inflating coefficient values and standard errors. 
Workers in firms of 51 employees or more show few significant variables in the three survey 
editions, suggesting that workers in large firms tend to be employed formally. The relatively 
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lower amount of differentiability can be attributed to the large proportion of formal workers or 
to worker indifference between formal and informal work when joining large firms. The models 
indicate that large firm workers tend to be older, married men that have higher levels of 
education and work in non-service jobs.  
Coefficient values on education attainment variables lower than middle school are negative 
for most model iterations. Magnitude and significance diminish as firm size increases, which 
implies graduating from elementary and middle school increase likelihood of finding formal work, 
particularly when searching for jobs in smaller firms. Education attainment above middle school 
has similar, but weaker, implications. Completing high school has positive effects across all three 
surveys with small standard errors, but completion of college only has consistently positive effect 
for workers in small firms. Low coefficient values and high standard errors suggest workers in 
large firms with a college education have no discernable correlation to formal or informal 
employment. This could represent a difference between high and low paid workers at larger 
firms. Firms have cost reduction incentives to avoid social security provision. Unskilled, low-wage 
workers in large firms are vulnerable to experiencing this regulation violation because alternative 
jobs in the informal sector leave them with low opportunity costs and little bargaining power. 
The lack of correlation between college education and formality may also be a result of 
characteristic uniformity within large firms.  
Small firms are the focal point of informality in Mexican labor markets. Summary statistics 
revealed that firms with less than 5 employees is the only firm size category populated by a 
significantly larger proportion of informal workers. Final model for workers in firms with 5 or less 
employees return stronger coefficient effects than models for workers in larger firms, because 
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worker characteristics are most likely to differentiate informal and formal workers in small firms. 
The differentiating variables are similar to those in large firms (formal small firm workers tend to 
be older, married men that have higher levels of education), but the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the effects are higher. Married men, college educated workers, high school 
educated workers, and white collar workers have high coefficient values compared across the 
different firm sizes and survey series. This is particularly strong evidence that these 
characteristics are associated with informality because firm size is an alternative informality 
measurement method.  
Violence 
Mexico has experienced a surge of violence in the 2000’s, mainly stemming from powerful 
drug cartels. This trend prompts an exploration of a previously uninvestigated topic: the 
relationship between individual experience of violence and labor market decisions. BenYishay 
and Pearlman show that violence reduces total hours worked, but no study relates experience of 
violence to informality. Using Mx-FLS and INEGI data, this relationship is addressed in two parts. 
First, Table 9 shows the results from running 4 versions of Model C, each containing a different 
variable representing violence. Second, the endogeneity in the assault variable is addressed using 
an instrumental variable identification. This analysis is done using only MxFLS-1 because violent 
assault data in MxFLS-2 and MxFLS-3 is unreliable. 
Table 9 presents only the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the violence related 
variables added for this section of the study. Model 1 in Table 9 shows results from including 
assault to Model C. The Assault variable, constructed from the MxFLS-1 survey, takes the value 
of 1 if an individual has ever experienced violent assault and a value of 0 if the individual has not. 
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The positive and significant result suggests that individuals who have experienced a violent 
assault have a lower propensity to join the informal sector than individuals who have never 
experienced a violent assault. To see if the robustness of the relationship between violence and 
formality status holds, assault municip is included in Model 2. The variable assault municip is a 
ratio that represents experiences of assault at the municipality an individual inhabits. Using data 
from MxFLS-1, total number of individuals that have experienced violent assault in a municipality 
is divided by number individuals in that municipality. This variable tests whether the violence 
occurring in a municipality has an effect on the general labor market in the municipality.  The 
coefficient value for the assault municip variable is positive but insignificant, which suggests there 
is no spillover effects of violence at the municipal level. This does not support the results in Model 
1 and provides evidence that the positive relationship between individuals who have been 
assaulted and informality may be correlated with formality through the error term. For two 
additional robustness tests, models 3 and 4 utilize variables that are constructed using homicide 
data from INEGI at the state and municipal levels. The variable homicide rate state in Model 3 
assigns state-level per-capita homicide rate to individuals for their respective state. This result is 
negative and insignificant, once again contradicting the significant result in Model 1. Homicide 
rate municip in Model 4 assigns the municipal-level per capita homicide rate to individuals living 
in the respective municipality. Once again, this result is negative and insignificant, suggesting 
further that violence rate does not have an impact on formality status.  
Although Models 2 – 4 in Table 9 contradict significance of violence, Model 1 still suggests 
that individuals that have experienced a violent assault may have a relationship with the formal 
sector. I hypothesize that the significance of the assault variable occurs because it is endogenous. 
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To instrument for endogeneity, I use the state homicide rate variable from Model 3 in Table 9. 
The instrumental variable receives a value of 1 if the corresponding individual lives in a state with 
a homicide rate higher than 1 per 10,000 people and 0 if lower than 1 per 10,000 people.  
In the case where endogeneity is present, there is an unobserved effect that drives the 
positive correlation. For example, workers may be simultaneously more susceptible to violence 
and more likely to be in the formal sector because they are wealthier. Another example of 
unobserved variation effecting formality and exposure to assault is age. Older workers are more 
likely to acquire a formal job and live longer, raising the probability that they will experience 
some form of violent assault.  
An IV can adjust for endogeneity if correctly identified. Correct identification occurs when the 
IV meets the relevance and exclusivity requirements. An instrument is relevant if it is correlated 
 41 
 
with the endogenous variable it is instrumenting and an IV is exclusive if it affects the dependent 
variable only through the endogenous variable it is instrumenting. The Exclusion category in 
Table 9 shows that there is no significant correlation between state homicide rate and job 
formality status and the First Stage category shows that state homicide rates are highly 
correlated with individual experience of assault.  
Second stage is the result from the instrumental variable regression. The estimate on violence 
in the second stage represents the effect that experiencing a violent assault has on formality 
status through the non-endogenous part of violence. The non-endogenous part of violence is 
identified by homicide rate, which meets the two requirements for an instrumental variable. The 
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results from IV 1 shows that violence has a negligible effect of formality status. Although the 
coefficient value is negative and large in magnitude, the standard error is high deeming the result 
insignificant.  
Conclusion 
The informal sector is an essential and functional feature of LDC labor markets worldwide. 
Informality is a dynamic concept and effective empirical research must adapt itself according to 
the context of national labor markets to uncover the specificities of informality in the country of 
study. This paper contributes to informality research by uncovering the relationship between 
worker characteristics and propensity to join the informal sector in Mexico. The following three 
research questions were addressed: 
 
1. How does educational attainment, relationship status, geographical location, and job type 
determine propensity to join the informal sector for men and women in Mexico? 
2. Does the relationship between these worker characteristics and informality vary across 
income levels and across firm size? 
3. Is there a relationship between violent assault and participation in the informal market? 
I find that younger, unmarried men and married women with lower levels of education 
living in small rural towns and working in the service sector have the highest propensity to work 
informally in Mexico. I also find that married women are more likely to work in the informal sector 
than married men and that individuals who completed high school have higher propensities to 
join the formal sector than individuals that complete college. In the income and firm size sections, 
I find formality differences between women and men exist in lower income groups and smaller 
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firms, but not upper income groups and larger firms. Additionally, high school and college 
education reduces likelihood of joining the informal sector for upper income groups, but not 
lower income groups. Older, married men that are not in non-service sector jobs tend to work in 
formal positions at large firms and small firms. Finally, analysis of violence suggests that violent 
assault experience has a negligible effect on formality status. 
My findings support the findings in Khamis (2009) and Gasparini and Tornaroli (2009) and 
contribute new information about the informal sector in Mexico. Findings that h igher levels of 
education, older age, and marriage reduce propensity to join the informal and that informal 
individuals are concentrated in low income groups and small firms supports previous literature. 
On the other hand, findings on married women, individuals in high income groups and large firms, 
and violence add new information to the Mexican informality literature. Further studies must 
address the relationship between public policy and informality, which continues to be an 
understudied feature of the Mexican informal sector. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Introduction 
 Labor market legislation literature provides substantive evidence suggesting Latin 
American countries tend to favor restrictive labor policies that support the well -being of formally 
employed workers (Edwards et al 2001; Murillo 2001). Favoring these kinds of policies typically 
comes at a cost; restrictiveness is associated with labor market inefficiencies such as increased 
unemployment and growth of the informal sector (Heckman and Pages 2000; Freeman 2000; 
Basu et al 1996). Consequently, labor legislation is central to the Latin American policy narrative. 
The labor discourse within each country includes proponents for increased regulation and a 
competing faction in favor of less regulation. This ideological dichotomy is evident in various Latin 
American countries, particularly in the case of Argentina where politically left Peronist regimes 
tend to intensify enforcement and politically right regimes that favor free trade policies and invite 
foreign direct investment are more likely to ‘turn a blind eye’ to enforcement (Ronconi 2010; 
Murillo 2011). The labor policy debate focuses on enforcement intensity and restrictiveness of 
prevailing laws, but policy makers pay less attention to the government’s ability to enforce labor 
laws effectively. Addressing this gap of knowledge is important because variability in violation 
rates across population segmentations changes the context for policy decisions. Recent studies 
in MERCOSUR countries have leveraged detailed individual level population surveys to measure 
labor law violation rates, which capture workers who experience violation and workers in the 
informal sector (Kanbur and Ronconi 2013; Ronconi 2010; Almeida 2007). The goal of this paper 
is to, first, use an individual level survey data to identify labor law violation rates for the case of 
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Uruguay, second, to extend the study using a variant of the Alkire-Foster multidimensional 
poverty measurement model and, third, to suggest a research agenda concerning enforcement 
resources and informality based on the finding  
Motivation  
In addition to policy relevance, the centrality of labor rights to Uruguay’s political 
narrative and the opportunity for comparison between MERCOSUR countries motivates this 
analysis of labor violation rates. Labor rights legislation is a particularly contentious policy debate 
in Uruguay that is rooted in the rich history of Uruguayan sindicatos, unions supported by the 
political left that leverage a considerable amount of political power. Socioeconomic outcomes of 
the unionist policy agenda, which positioned Uruguay as a pioneer in socioeconomic labor 
reform, sharply contrast the corruption that plagued union leadership and the civil disorder 
caused by strikes and protests. As a reaction to economic recession in the 1970’s, the military 
dictatorship stoked the heated policy debate by outlawing collective bargaining and sequestering 
union leaders. Democracy saw collective bargaining laws return to the political arena with 
powerful political and emotional baggage that transcend ideology and cause the Uruguayan labor 
law debate to be particularly contentious (Alexander 2005). Internationally, there is potential to 
gain insight from comparison of compliance rates between in Uruguay and the economically 
similar MERCOSUR countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, where empirical studies have 
addressed labor law violation. 
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Literature Review  
 Literature examining outcomes of labor restrictions is deep and inconclusive. The goal of 
this literature review is to accentuate labor market regulation implications for developing 
countries and to review empirical studies on violation and compliance in Latin America.  
Labor regulation across countries varies due to the heterogeneous nature of labor 
markets. Unique elements of a labor markets change the policy strategy in different countries 
and in different sectors within that country. Salient features of labor markets in developing 
countries include: low earnings levels, long work hours, uncertainty, and gender inequality. In the 
words of Gary Fields, “developing countries have an employment problem – that is, poverty 
among those who work – rather than an unemployment problem” (Fields 2004). Therefore, 
regulation in developing countries often has different implications than regulation in developed 
countries. For example, the effect of regulation on poverty and income distribution is shown to 
be particularly steep in Latin America (Khamis 2013; Lustig 1996). Specifically, Maloney and 
Mendez argue that “the tradeoff between any possible effect on poverty and reduced flexibility 
is likely to be more severe in Latin America” (Maloney and Mendex 2004). In a study comparing 
minimum wage policy in the United States and Puerto Rico, Freeman concludes that when a 
minimum wage policy with little employment implications in the United States is implemented 
in Puerto Rico, unemployment increases severely (Freeman and Freeman 1991). This highlights 
the importance of developing a deep understanding of the implications labor regulation policy 
has in Latin America. 
Considering the relevance of labor law enforcement to the context of Latin American 
development, large gaps in the Uruguayan labor regulation literature exist. There is no formal 
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description of true violation rates and there is no analysis connecting enforcement resources 
with labor market compliance or informality with labor regulations. This kind of research is 
undertaken in a variety of developing countries, many in the MERCOSUR region  (Kanbur and 
Ronconi 2013; Bhorat et al 2012; Ronconi 2012; Ronconi 2010; Almeida and Roncoi). For brevity 
and relevance, this literature review will focus on MERCOSUR countries. In Chile, one third of 
workers are excluded from at least one of four legally mandated benefits and higher levels of 
non-compliance is experienced among women, indigenous peoples, less educated workers and 
workers in smaller firms. Probit models suggest that race, age, years of schooling, and gender are 
significant determinants of non-compliance. Studies in Brazil and Argentina address the 
relationship between enforcement intensity, informality, and economic outcomes. In the case of 
Brazil, Almeida finds that a standard deviation increase in the log of inspections per firm leads to 
a 15 percentage point reduction in the proportion of informal workers in the city, a 9 percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate, and a 5 percentage point reduction in the poverty rate. 
For the case of Argentina, Ronconi attempt to model the relationship between likelihood of 
violation, measured using a multidimensional approach, and enforcement intensity. Presence of 
democratically elected politicians is used to instrument enforcement intensity, addressing the 
endogeneity that exists between enforcement and compliance. Ronconi finds that regions with 
more labor inspectors and democratically elected presidents tend to see a reduction in firm 
noncompliance.  
 48 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data  
 Data for this paper is from the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH), an annual survey 
conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica in Montevideo, Uruguay. ECH is a household 
and individual level survey that contains demographic and labor market characteristics. The 
survey contains 46,937 household observations and 132,600 individual observations. For the 
purposes of this study, I will focus on adults with a primary source of income that are not self-
employed, are not employed in domestic work, or are not employers. The sample size for this 
subset of laborers in the 2014 survey is 38,129 observations. Additional details provided upon 
request. The longitudinal analysis uses data from 2002 through 2014 and the cross-sectional 
analysis uses data from 2014. The intention of the yearly analysis is to capture changes in labor 
law violations before and after the Argentine credit crisis of 2001 and the 2008 recession. The 
descriptive analysis will offer perspective on the current state of compliance in Uruguay.  
Minimum Wage Legislation 
 Historically, the Uruguayan government has placed a high level of importance on labor 
laws and labor regulation. In 1943, the Uruguayan government, under President Juan Jose de 
Amezaga, conducted a study of Uruguayan low and middle class worker living conditions, an 
unprecedented effort in Latin America. The study was followed by the creation of “el consejo de 
salaries,” a piece of legislation emphasizing the role of the minimum wage as a level of income 
that “allows the worker to satisfy his or her physical, intellectual, and moral obligations.” World 
Bank and government data shows that Uruguayan minimum wage increases are among the  
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steepest in Latin America. A new minimum wage is mandated every year and sometimes more 
than once every year. The chart below shows minimum wage changes every January in the years 
of focus for this study at nominal rates and real values using 2010 Uruguayan pesos as a baseline. 
Minimum wage changes within years are not listed.  
Additional legislation 
 In addition to minimum wage standards, the Uruguayan government provides workers 
with the right to paid vacation, overtime pay, social security, and bi-yearly Aguinaldo bonuses. 
The strictness of these regulations are, in large part, a result of the powerful sindicatos. The initial 
empirical analysis for this paper focuses on compliance of three labor laws in addition to 
minimum wage: hourly workweek, Aguinaldo payment, and social security provision. Uruguayan 
workers are limited to working 8 hours per week and either 44 or 48 hours per month, depending 
on the industry the worker participates in. The second labor law we measure is the Aguinaldo. 
Year of min wage change (January) Nominal Min Wage Real Min Wage (2010) 
2002 
2005 
2007 
1040.00 
2500.00 
3244.00 
2011.22 
3544.10 
3997.54 
2008 4150.00 4741.23 
2009 
2010 
2011  
4441.00 
4799.00 
6000.00 
4743.57 
4799 
5550.93 
2012 7200.00 6161.75 
2013  
2014 
7920.00 
8960.00 
6242.61 
6486.64 
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This is a required bonus worth one monthly salary (pay in Uruguay is measured by month) paid 
every December and June, so the Uruguayan worker effectively gets 13 months of pay 
throughout the year. Lastly, the Uruguayan government requires firms to enroll workers in the 
social security contribution programs. Two additional pieces of legislation, vacation pay and 
overtime pay, are included to complete the Alkire – Foster extension. The extensions section 
describes these additions in detail. 
Methodology 
Minimum wage violation measurement will follow the methodology developed by Bhorat 
et al. for analysis of the South African labor market:2  
 
 
The Va variable measures different aspects of minimum wage violation that depend on the value 
of alpha (0, 1, or 2). V0 is a binary variable that describes whether an individual is earning less 
than the minimum wage. The V0 value is a headcount ratio of workers in the identified subdivision 
that earn less than the minimum wage. V1 and V2 measure shortfall depth, where V2 emphasizes 
larger gaps. The ratio V0/ V1 is the average percentage shortfall of workers earning below the 
minimum wage in a particular subdivision.  
 Calculating measurements for other labor law violations is much more straightforward. 
For hourly workweek, Aguinaldo payment, and social security coverage a dummy variable is 
assigned a value of 1 for workers that are violated and 0 for workers that are not violated. Total 
                                                             
2 See Bhorat et al (2011) for full methodology 
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workers facing a violation divided by total eligible workers in the specific labor market 
segmentation results in a headcount ratio, which is the value presented in the results tables.  
Results 
Kernel density plots  
 Kernel density plots presented in the appendix, based on the natural logarithm of hourly 
wage, demonstrate distributions in wages for different sectoral determinations available in the 
ECH. The red vertical line indicates the natural logarithm of the 2014 hourly minimum wage. 
Sections of the density function that lie to the left of the red line represent laborers who receive 
an hourly wage lower than the minimum hourly wage. A simple visual analysis suggests that 
workers who participate in the public sector, are highly educated, work in larger firms, and live 
in urban areas are less likely to earn below the hourly minimum wage than workers who have 
low levels of education and workers who are employed by small firms. In addition to revealing 
characteristics of minimum wage earners, kernel densities provide insight by revealing peculiar 
patterns at the minimum wage line. A prominent branch of wage theory asserts that a spike in 
wages occurs at the minimum wage line because of a firm’s decision to either comply and pay 
workers the legal minimum wage or not comply and pay below minimum wage (Ashenfelter and 
Smith 1979). For the case of Uruguay, kernel density plots with substantial amounts of workers 
earning less than the minimum wage do not show spikes at the minimum wage line. In fact, the 
slope of wage distribution illustrated by these kernel density plots tends to increase and decrease 
smoothly. This outcome suggests different theoretical underpinnings. It could be the case that 
instead of making the decision whether to comply with minimum wage, firms that have decided 
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to pay below the minimum wage must choose the level of severity at which to violate the law. 
This decision depends on risk of receiving a fine, a function of enforcement effectiveness, and 
punishment rates. Because the Uruguayan government does not provide this information  
(Marinakis 2014), further research into relationship between spikes at the minimum wage 
distribution and enforcement effectiveness is required. 
Violation Estimates 
 This section discusses violation rate measurement results for various segmentations of 
Uruguayan workers. Four dimensions of labor laws are presented: minimum wage, hours worked, 
yearly bonus, and enrollment in social security programs. Each table also presents the ratio of 
workers facing one or more violation. The results cover violation rates for the various 
segmentations in extensive detail, so I will only be discussing particularly notable results.  
 Figure 4 shows share of workers the experience one or more labor violation over time. 
The decreasing trend line shows labor law compliance in Uruguay improved between 2002 and 
2014. Table 11 presents average occurrence of labor law violation for all Uruguayan workers in 
years 2002 - 2014. Before continuing the analysis, it is important to note that, for years 2002 – 
2013, I am unable to correctly identify the hours worked violation dimension because the ECH 
does not ask workers if they receive overtime pay. The hourly violation measurements marked 
with * count any worker that worked more than 48 hours in one week and are not particularly 
insightful.  The measurements of one or more violation marked with * only take minimum wage, 
Aguinaldo, and social security into account, although these headcount ratios continue to be 
insightful for the analysis. V0 values tend to remain relatively constant around 6% of all workers, 
although average shortfall percentage continuously increases over time. This indicates that, 
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while the headcount of workers violated in the minimum wage dimension remains constant, 
wages for violated workers are decreasing over time. In 2011, 2013, and 2014 workers earning 
less than the minimum wage experienced, on average, over a 50% shortfall rate. The ratio of 
workers violated in Aguinaldo bonus and social security dimensions decreased sharply between 
2002 and 2014. These decreases contributed to the fall in workers experiencing one or more 
violation. This trend is particularly interesting, as it is probable a causal relationship between the 
decrease in these violation rates and an outside shock to the Uruguayan labor market exists.  
 Tables 12, 3, and 14 present labor law violation rates for various worker segmentations 
in 2014. In order to provide a point of comparison, notice that, in 2014, 6.2% of Uruguayan 
workers earn below the minimum wage, average wage shortfall was 51.2%, 7.1% of workers did 
not receive Aguinaldo bonus, 8.4% of workers did not receive social security, and 17.5% 
experienced violation in at least one of these dimensions. Table 12 analyses workers by 
segmenting into age, gender, education, residence upon birth, and ethnicity. Early career workers 
and retirement age workers experience the most frequent incidences of one or more violation 
with rates of 23.7% and 37.8% respectively. Females are more likely to be violated in at least one 
dimension than males, although the difference is only 2.4%. When workers separated by 
education level we see that higher education levels result in a lower probability of facing at least 
one violation. The downward trend seen in Figure 5 highlights the strength of this relationship. 
Differences in place of residence upon birth do not cause strong variation in probability of 
experiencing one or more violation. Finally, segmentation by ethnicity shows that black 
Uruguayans are most likely to experience at least one violation. Particularly striking i s the 11.3% 
rate of minimum wage violation for black Uruguayans. 
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 Table 13 segments workers into employment type (private employers, public employers, 
cooperative employment, and social program employment) and firm size. The rate of one or 
more violation for privately employed workers was 18.1%, 16.9% higher than publicly employed 
workers. This suggests that the government closely follows its own minimum wage laws, but may 
experience difficulties enforcing in the private sector. Workers participating in cooperative and 
social program employment are much more likely to experience at least one violation than 
private or public sector workers. These results are unsurprising as both of these employment 
options are short term safeguards against frictional or structural unemployment. Firm size has 
large variation in violation rates. In single-person firms, 21.4% of workers earn below the 
minimum wage and 50% of workers are violated in at least one dimension. As firm size increases, 
fraction of workers facing at least one violation decreases sharply. Workers at firms with more 
than 9 employees are less likely to experience a labor law violation than the average Uruguayan 
worker. 
 Table 14 presents labor violation measures for workers segmented into the 19 state 
departments of Uruguay and into urban or rural residence. Montevideo, the only urban 
department, has a relatively low rate of at least one violation, 10%. Comparing violation rates 
across departments, we notice that many departments with high violation rates, such as Artigas, 
Cerro Largo, Salto, and Rivera lie on the border with Brazil or Argentina. The strong difference in 
violation rates between Montevideo and the border regions may result from the fact that 
Montevideo is the administrative locus of the Uruguayan government, and border regions are 
farthest from the captal. Finally, workers are seperated into an urban category, 2 small town 
categories, and a rural category. Rural workers have the highest likelihood of experiencing at 
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least one violation, with a rate of 22%. Workers in Montevideo earn below the minimum wage 
at a relatively low rate, but there is little variation in fraction of workers earning below minimum 
wage between urban and rural areas. 
 Lastly, a probit analysis is conducted to check the validity of relationships identified in the 
data description exercise. Experiencing one or more violation is the dependent variable for all 
three models. Model 1 includes independent variables representing three worker segmentations 
where violation rates varied significantly: age, education, and gender. The education variable is 
transformed into a continuous measure of total years of school for ease of interpretation. Since 
all variables are highly significant, the model provides further evidence that older, well educated, 
male workers are less likely to experience at least one labor law violation. In the second model, 
variables representing black workers and workers living in cities with more than 5,000 people 
also appear to be highly significant. This suggests that non-black, urban workers are also less 
likely to experience at least one labor violation in Uruguay. Lastly, model 3 includes dummy 
variables for the 19 regions and for firm size. The important change to notice after the addition 
of these dummies is the change bigtown from negative to positive and from significant to 
insignificant. Accounting for the worker’s region may be endogenous with the bigtown variable, 
reducing explanatory power.  
 Three major takeaways from the results of this analysis are 1) labor law violation has 
progressively decreased since 2002 2) black, female, and young laborers who have low education, 
live in rural areas, and work in small firms are most likely to face at least one labor violation and 
3) rural regions and regions near the border of Uruguay have higher violation rates than 
Montevideo.  
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Research Extensions 
 After developing an understanding of labor law violation rates in the Uruguayan labor 
market, additional research questions can be addressed. In this section, I will extend my analysis 
of Uruguayan labor law violation by applying the Alkire – Foster method to labor violation 
dimensions and discuss additional possible research extensions. 
Alkire-Foster Method 
 Alkire and Foster (2011) propose a model that measures poverty from a multi-
dimensional perspective. The intuition behind the model is as follows. First, an appropriate 
headcount measurement identifies whether an individual is in poverty. For each dimension of 
poverty, individual 𝑝𝑖  receives a value of 0 if the individual is not considered deprived and a value 
of 1 if the individual is considered deprived. A summation of the dummy variables across all 
dimensions for each individual produces a poverty score for individual i. In order to derive a 
headcount measurement the researcher must select a cutoff point, or the total count of deprived 
dimensions that qualifies an individual as poor from a multi-dimensional perspective. Alkire and 
Foster assign variable H to identify the poverty headcount ratio. In addition to the headcount 
ratio, deprivation share across the poor is factored into the analysis. Denoted as A, average 
deprivation share is included because the headcount ratio fails to capture changes in the 
dimensional deprivation count among individuals that already are considered poor. For example, 
if an individual is considered deprived in three dimensions, the value of H will not change when 
that individual becomes deprived in six dimensions. Measurement A is the total inciden ces of 
deprivation divided by the product of total dimensions and total individuals in poverty. The 
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product of H and A results in a simple measurement, M, that is sensitive to the frequency and 
breadth of poverty:  
𝑀 = 𝐻𝐴 =
𝑞
𝑛
∗
𝑐(𝑘)
𝑞𝑑
 
Adaptation of Alkire-Foster 
While this paper does not address poverty directly, the availability of multiple labor 
compliance measurements allows for implementation of the Alkire-Foster method to identify an 
alternative measurement for workers that do not meet compliance standards. In order to mimic 
the Alkire Foster method for labor market compliance, additional compliance dimensions must 
be identified and the methodology used by Alkire and Foster must be reinterpreted for the case 
of a labor market. 
 In the 2014 ECH, questions addressing the availability of paid holiday and paid overtime 
hours allow for the construction of two additional dimensions of labor compliance. In Uruguay, 
workers are entitled to holiday pay equal to 100% of salaried pay. The ECH question asking adults 
in the labor market if they are offered paid vacation time is used to construct a dummy variable 
for the fifth compliance dimension in this study. Workers that report access to holiday pay receive 
an assignment of one and workers that report no access to holiday pay receive an assignment of 
zero. The second ECH question addresses overtime pay by asking workers whether they receive 
lawful compensation for working overtime. The Uruguayan government requires firms to pay 
double salary to employees that work over 44 or 48 hours per week, depending on industry. This 
question is already integrated into the calculation of the workhours dimension, as employees 
that work overtime and receive the legal overtime pay are counted as compliant with work hours 
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legislation. Nonetheless, lawful overtime compensation is an insightful sixth dimension of labor 
compliance because workers that choose to avoid overtime work because they do not receive 
fair pay are observed by the question.  
 An adjustment of the M measurement fits the context of labor violations intuitively, 
allowing for insightful replication of the Alkire and Foster method. Total population, n, will remain 
unchanged and total deprived individuals, q, will become total individuals with two or more 
compliance violations, qv. For the purposes of this study, individuals included in q v are non-
compliant workers and the headcount measurement Hv represents the percentage of individuals 
in the labor market that are non-compliant. Variable 𝑐𝑖(𝑘) , the fraction of dimensions an 
individual is deprived in, will become 𝑐𝑖(𝑣) , fraction of labor laws an individual violates. 
Measurement Av is the average violation share across non-compliant individuals. Under this 
redefinition, we have the following expression for M (where dv is violation dimensions):  
𝑀𝑣 = 𝐻𝑣𝐴𝑣 =
𝑞𝑣
𝑛
∗
𝑐(𝑣)
𝑞𝑣𝑑𝑣
 
A second measurement, 𝑀0
𝑏 , is also included. This measurement simply changes the weight of 
the minimum wage dimension to 50% and assigns the remaining dimensions a weight of 10%. 
This adjustment follows the methodology of the Mexican government, who use multidimensional 
poverty measurements with 50% weight assigned to income in order to highlight its importance. 
Alkire-Foster Results 
For brevity, this labor compliance application of the Alkire-Foster method focuses on 
three population subdivisions of interest identified in section 3.3: education level, firm size, and 
urban or non-urban residence. Table 15 presents violation frequency for all six compliance 
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measures. The final column shows frequency of violating two or more dimensions, or the 
headcount value H, for each subdivision. While adding two additional dimensions increases the 
severity of headcount measures, violation patterns in table 15 follow the patterns discussed in 
section 3. Table 16 shows the Alkire-Foster results. The first variable of interest is the headcount 
percentage (column 4), which represents the fraction of workers that experience two or more 
violations contributed by each segmentation. This measurement allows us to account for both 
violation rates and total members of a particular segmentation. The results suggest a 
reevaluation of firm size and urban rural segmentations. Although analysis in part 3 showed firms 
with only one employee caused the steepest violations, a majority of workers facing two or more 
violations are employed by firms with 2 to 9 people. Additionally, rural workers, who experienced 
the steepest violation rates, only constitute 7.6% of workers facing more than 2 violations, 
compared to the 53.7% contribution rate from workers in urban areas with populations larger 
than 5,000 people. In terms of policy relevance, the Uruguayan government should focus on 
reducing violation incidences among groups with both steep violation rates and large percentage 
contribution rates. The other variables of interest presented in Table 16 are 𝑀0
𝑎  and 𝑀0
𝑏 . As 
discussed in the description of methodology, the M value measures both incidence of violation 
and depth of violation. Two interesting observations are made. First, we see that, while the 𝑀0
𝑎  
and 𝑀0
𝑏  values for workers in single person firms and for rural workers are the highest in their 
respective segmentation groups, as was true for the headcount measurement. This implies that 
workers in groups with high headcount ratios also experience violation in a high percentage of 
dimensions. Second, for each case, the value of the 𝑀0
𝑎  is greater than the value of the 𝑀0
𝑏  
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measurement. This suggests that minimum wage infraction is not a strong contributor to 
experiencing violation in two or more dimensions.   
Enforcement Resources  
 Variation in labor law violation rates between urban and rural workers and between 
workers in Montevideo and workers in states at the border with Brazil and Argentina provide a 
foundation for further analysis on the relationship between labor law violation and enforcement 
resources. As discussed in the literature review, Ronconi uses Argentine data to estimate the 
effect of enforcement on compliance, using the number of labor inspectors per capita as the 
explanatory variable and democratic regimes to instrument for endogeneity. Labor inspectors 
per capita may be endogenous to a model estimating compliance due to a reverse causality, 
where low compliance invites more inspectors and more inspectors increases pressure to 
comply. The strong similarities between Argentine and Uruguayan political cultures and 
geographic evidence from the identification exercise suggest that replication of the study could 
reinforce the significance enforcement resources plays in determining compliance levels.  
Informality of worker  
 A final potentially interesting research topic is identification of the relationship between 
labor law violations and informality. Initial intuition leads one to think that informal firms have 
no incentive to provide labor rights mandated by the government, since informal firms operate 
without government recognition. Another school of thought suggests that informal firms are 
incentivized to provide workers with legal labor standards to compete with other informal firms 
and as a mechanism to avoid being detected by the government.  
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Conclusion 
 This paper set out to, first, identify labor law violation rates for the case of Uruguay, 
second, to extend the study using a variant of the Alkire-Foster multidimensional poverty 
measurement model and, third, to suggest a research agenda based on the findings. From the 
identification exercise, we observe three major findings: 1) labor law violation has progressively 
decreased since 2002 2) black, female, and young laborers who have low education, live in rural 
areas, and work in small firms are most likely to face at least one labor violation and 3) rural 
regions and regions near the border of Uruguay have higher violation rates than Montevideo. 
Alkire – Foster analysis provides two findings relevant to policymakers: 1) percentage 
contribution measurement accounts for both violation rates and total members of a 
segmentation, allowing for targeting of deprived populations and 2) the M value, which measures 
both incidence of violation and depth of violation, allows for identification of labor market 
segmentations that experience the steepest labor law violations.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 2002 Data
All obs IF obs F obs Diff P Val
female .385 (5510) .387 (3720) .381 (1790) .006 .663
hh head .443 (5510) .423 (3720) .482 (1790) -.058 .000
married .462 (5510) .438 (3720) .510 (1790) -.071 .000
urban .723 (5468) .698 (3695) .772 (1773) -.074 .000
assault .171 (5510) .152 (3720) .209 (1790) -.056 .000
age
15 - 21 .200 (5504) .228 (3718) .143 (1786) .084 .000
21 - 30 .225 (5504) .214 (3718) .246 (1786) -.023 .007
30 - 41 .190 (5504) .185 (3718) .200 (1786) -.015 .172
41 - 54 .196 (5504) .182 (3718) .227 (1786) -.045 .000
> 54 .186 (5504) .189 (3718) .181 (1786) .008 .464
education
< Prim .167 (5495) .196 (3710) .108 (1785) .087 .000
Primary .241 (5495) .255 (3710) .212 (1785) .042 .001
Secondary .355 (5495) .346 (3710) .373 (1785) -.026 .054
High School .113 (5495) .096 (3710) .146 (1785) -.050 .000
College .122 (5495) .105 (3710) .158 (1785) -.053 .000
job type
Blue Collar .410 (5481) .416 (3701) .395 (1780) .021 .131
Wht Collar .383 (5481) .350 (3701) .451 (1780) -.100 .000
Service .207 (5481) .232 (3701) .153 (1780) .079 .000
income group
Lower .333 (5223) .360 (3505) .277 (1718) .083 .000
Middle .347 (5223) .364 (3505) .314 (1718) .049 .000
Upper .318 (5223) .275 (3505) .408 (1718) -.132 .000
firm size
5 or Less .422 (5274) .517 (3598) .219 (1676) .297 .000
6 - 50 .409 (5274) .361 (3598) .513 (1676) -.151 .000
51 - 250 .105 (5274) .080 (3598) .159 (1676) -.079 .000
251 or More .061 (5274) .040 (3598) .107 (1676) -.067 .000
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 2005 Data
All obs IF obs F obs Diff P Val
female .376 (5249) .378 (3390) .373 (1859) .005 .712
hh head .416 (5249) .397 (3390) .449 (1859) -.052 .000
married .453 (5249) .422 (3390) .509 (1859) -.087 1.19
urban .729 (5188) .699 (3357) .784 (1831) -.085 2.92
assault .112 (5202) .100 (3356) .134 (1846) -.034 .000
age
15 - 21 .221 (5195) .252 (3355) .164 (1840) .087 2.76
21 - 30 .206 (5195) .201 (3355) .216 (1840) -.014 .216
30 - 41 .190 (5195) .171 (3355) .224 (1840) -.052 4.04
41 - 54 .186 (5195) .176 (3355) .205 (1840) -.028 .011
> 54 .194 (5195) .197 (3355) .189 (1840) .007 .491
education
< Prim .161 (5160) .192 (3327) .105 (1833) .086 4.32
Primary .240 (5160) .263 (3327) .199 (1833) .063 3.02
Secondary .358 (5160) .342 (3327) .386 (1833) -.043 .001
High School .128 (5160) .107 (3327) .166 (1833) -.059 8.45
College .110 (5160) .093 (3327) .141 (1833) -.047 1.86
job type
Blue Collar .417 (5156) .447 (3323) .362 (1833) .085 2.68
Wht Collar .394 (5156) .338 (3323) .494 (1833) -.155 4.11
Service .188 (5156) .213 (3323) .143 (1833) .070 6.62
income group
Lower .362 (4828) .442 (3108) .217 (1720) .225 3.52
Middle .311 (4828) .306 (3108) .321 (1720) -.014 .285
Upper .325 (4828) .250 (3108) .461 (1720) -.210 1.31
firm size
5 or Less .465 (4786) .573 (3156) .256 (1630) .317 5.8e
6 - 50 .396 (4786) .342 (3156) .500 (1630) -.157 2.53
51 - 250 .083 (4786) .053 (3156) .142 (1630) -.088 4.37
251 or More .054 (4786) .030 (3156) .101 (1630) -.070 8.90
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 2009 Data
All obs IF obs F obs Diff P Val
female .386 (6051) .382 (3619) .391 (2432) -.008 .513
hh head .376 (6067) .363 (3631) .396 (2436) -.032 .010
married .447 (6067) .412 (3631) .500 (2436) -.087 .000
urban .627 (5913) .595 (3557) .676 (2356) -.080 .000
assault .078 (3780) .080 (2122) .077 (1658) .002 .741
age
15 - 21 .217 (6002) .267 (3591) .144 (2411) .122 .000
21 - 30 .206 (6002) .191 (3591) .228 (2411) -.036 .000
30 - 41 .177 (6002) .151 (3591) .215 (2411) -.063 .000
41 - 54 .202 (6002) .182 (3591) .232 (2411) -.050 .000
/sym¿ 54 .195 (6002) .207 (3591) .178 (2411) .028 .006
education
< Prim .141 (5988) .179 (3580) .086 (2408) .092 .000
Primary .225 (5988) .264 (3580) .168 (2408) .096 .000
Secondary .367 (5988) .360 (3580) .377 (2408) -.017 .166
High School .151 (5988) .117 (3580) .202 (2408) -.085 .000
College .113 (5988) .078 (3580) .164 (2408) -.086 .000
job type
Blue Collar .244 (5439) .224 (3284) .275 (2155) -.051 .000
Wht Collar .513 (5439) .490 (3284) .547 (2155) -.057 .000
Service .242 (5439) .285 (3284) .176 (2155) .108 .000
income group
Lower .340 (5211) .431 (3146) .200 (2065) .231 .000
Middle .382 (5211) .383 (3146) .380 (2065) .003 .825
Upper .277 (5211) .184 (3146) .418 (2065) -.234 .000
firm size
5 or Less .485 (5751) .630 (3506) .259 (2245) .371 .000
6 - 50 .388 (5751) .318 (3506) .497 (2245) -.178 .000
51 - 250 .077 (5751) .035 (3506) .142 (2245) -.107 .000
251 or More .048 (5751) .015 (3506) .100 (2245) -.084 .000
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Table 4: Khamis Social Security Probit Replication
Khamis Replication Replication Replication
2005 2002 2005 2009
female -0.039 0.056 0.063 0.013
(0.06) (0.045) (0.052) (0.044)
age 0.006∗ 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
household head 0.043 0.121** 0.088 -0.007
(0.071) (0.051) (0.061) (0.048)
married 0.197∗∗ 0.078 0.177** 0.148***
(0.095) (0.064) (0.077) (0.057)
single 0.129 -0.047 -0.001 -0.135**
(0.098) (0.070) (0.080) (0.062)
divorced 0.16 0.004 0.003 0.148
(0.131) (0.092) (0.111) (0.090)
primary edu. 0.359∗∗ 0.283** 0.257** -0.117
(0.158) (0.113) (0.127) (0.104)
Secondary 0.629∗∗∗ 0.579*** 0.590*** 0.399***
(0.156) (0.114) (0.125) (0.101)
tertiary 0.591∗∗∗ 0.664*** 0.665*** 0.712***
(0.164) (0.124) (0.139) (0.116)
ability 0.019∗ 0.012* 0.027*** 0.022***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 5319 3595 4585
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Changing the Original Specifications
A B C A B C A B C
MxFLS-1 MxFLS-1 MxFLS-1 MxFLS-2 MxFLS-2 MxFLS-2 MxFLS-3 MxFLS-3 MxFLS-3
female 0.022 0.004 0.084 -0.003 -0.011 -0.024 -0.073* -0.068* 0.129**
(0.043) (0.045) (0.054) (0.046) (0.045) (0.057) (0.038) (0.040) (0.053)
age 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.093***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
agesq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hh head 0.105** 0.110** 0.039 0.066 0.073 0.044 0.025 0.032 0.006
(0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (0.048) (0.050) (0.055) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048)
married 0.041 0.075* 0.183*** 0.127*** 0.095** 0.142** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.171***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.058) (0.042) (0.044) (0.057) (0.038) (0.040) (0.054)
urban 0.117*** 0.108** 0.209*** 0.196*** 0.261*** 0.268***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.042)
fem× mar -0.262*** -0.127 -0.204**
(0.089) (0.090) (0.082)
education
< Element. -0.455*** -0.448*** -0.425*** -0.551*** -0.468*** -0.419*** -0.550*** -0.513*** -0.486***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.065) (0.062) (0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.062) (0.066)
Elementary -0.187*** -0.193*** -0.179*** -0.303*** -0.281*** -0.244*** -0.362*** -0.357*** -0.355***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051)
High School 0.150** 0.182*** 0.190*** 0.212*** 0.276*** 0.211*** 0.323*** 0.320*** 0.348***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.051) (0.053) (0.057)
College 0.093 0.056 0.090 0.165*** 0.187*** 0.096 0.400*** 0.376*** 0.424***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.058) (0.061) (0.065)
job type
Wht Collar 0.025 0.253*** -0.219***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.047)
Service -0.246*** -0.087 -0.445***
(0.055) (0.059) (0.058)
Observations 5450 5409 5397 5097 5041 5027 5947 5802 5206
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: Income Extension
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper
2002 2002 2002 2005 2005 2005 2009 2009 2009
female 0.016 0.259*** 0.222** 0.006 0.164* 0.087 0.018 0.351*** 0.440***
(0.091) (0.094) (0.102) (0.102) (0.093) (0.116) (0.097) (0.092) (0.103)
age 0.070*** 0.042*** 0.024 0.036** 0.023* 0.035* 0.096*** 0.059*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
agesq -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hh head 0.129 -0.028 0.039 0.033 -0.053 0.048 -0.073 -0.012 0.051
(0.100) (0.102) (0.093) (0.105) (0.089) (0.095) (0.094) (0.078) (0.078)
married 0.074 0.305*** 0.166* 0.367*** 0.143 0.018 0.192* 0.153* 0.125
(0.104) (0.106) (0.092) (0.114) (0.090) (0.098) (0.110) (0.084) (0.085)
urban 0.107 0.011 -0.052 0.133* 0.185** 0.139 0.314*** 0.221*** 0.096
(0.074) (0.076) (0.087) (0.078) (0.074) (0.093) (0.076) (0.071) (0.080)
fem× mar -0.193 -0.401** -0.214 -0.403** -0.199 -0.101 -0.235 -0.144 -0.372**
(0.158) (0.156) (0.151) (0.167) (0.149) (0.162) (0.153) (0.136) (0.147)
education
< Element. -0.363*** -0.453*** -0.349*** -0.430*** -0.310*** -0.368** -0.456*** -0.300*** -0.510***
(0.113) (0.111) (0.126) (0.114) (0.107) (0.144) (0.117) (0.103) (0.153)
Elementary -0.086 -0.219** -0.227** -0.224** -0.164** -0.197* -0.413*** -0.233*** -0.299***
(0.088) (0.087) (0.095) (0.094) (0.079) (0.109) (0.094) (0.081) (0.105)
High School 0.307*** 0.011 0.133 0.009 0.206* 0.309*** 0.208* 0.247** 0.339***
(0.119) (0.113) (0.093) (0.116) (0.105) (0.102) (0.110) (0.098) (0.093)
College 0.220* 0.101 -0.003 -0.224 -0.140 0.222** 0.169 0.216* 0.416***
(0.121) (0.111) (0.089) (0.137) (0.127) (0.095) (0.135) (0.119) (0.087)
job type
Wht Collar 0.057 0.020 -0.004 0.187** 0.227*** 0.190** -0.342*** -0.223*** -0.162*
(0.088) (0.085) (0.082) (0.094) (0.078) (0.092) (0.089) (0.075) (0.092)
Service -0.133 -0.302*** -0.177 -0.186* -0.014 0.028 -0.550*** -0.368*** -0.101
(0.093) (0.093) (0.109) (0.110) (0.095) (0.120) (0.106) (0.093) (0.118)
Observations 1834 1838 1842 1770 1864 1578 1801 1875 1806
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Firm Size Extension
5 or Less 6 - 50 51 or More 5 or Less 6 - 50 51 or More 5 or Less 6 - 50 51 or More
2002 2002 2002 2005 2005 2005 2009 2009 2009
female -0.087 0.108 0.213 -0.286*** 0.078 0.257 0.095 0.246*** 0.166
(0.107) (0.085) (0.134) (0.109) (0.093) (0.162) (0.094) (0.087) (0.167)
age 0.068*** 0.047*** 0.057** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.015 0.080*** 0.096*** 0.073**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.028) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030)
agesq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hh head -0.030 0.086 -0.048 0.069 -0.034 0.072 0.058 0.050 0.010
(0.104) (0.089) (0.135) (0.101) (0.090) (0.168) (0.079) (0.077) (0.150)
married 0.282** 0.047 0.191 0.204* 0.091 0.065 0.162* 0.091 0.040
(0.115) (0.086) (0.137) (0.106) (0.093) (0.174) (0.093) (0.084) (0.163)
urban 0.082 0.101 -0.011 0.034 0.266*** 0.062 0.235*** 0.293*** 0.025
(0.079) (0.070) (0.113) (0.077) (0.077) (0.138) (0.071) (0.069) (0.135)
fem× mar -0.355** -0.049 -0.464** -0.203 -0.017 -0.115 -0.161 -0.056 -0.361
(0.163) (0.140) (0.223) (0.159) (0.149) (0.281) (0.136) (0.134) (0.274)
education
< Element. -0.316*** -0.295*** -0.141 -0.501*** -0.146 -0.307 -0.492*** -0.592*** 0.310
(0.115) (0.106) (0.181) (0.115) (0.116) (0.205) (0.106) (0.115) (0.259)
Elementary -0.207** -0.122 0.007 -0.193** -0.099 -0.143 -0.418*** -0.257*** -0.331**
(0.094) (0.080) (0.121) (0.094) (0.087) (0.149) (0.087) (0.083) (0.157)
High School 0.152 0.093 0.171 0.293*** 0.198** 0.356** 0.405*** 0.216** 0.139
(0.119) (0.094) (0.148) (0.110) (0.099) (0.178) (0.095) (0.090) (0.165)
College 0.117 -0.039 0.061 0.292** -0.088 0.099 0.480*** 0.240** 0.261
(0.123) (0.093) (0.147) (0.123) (0.104) (0.188) (0.109) (0.098) (0.205)
job type
Wht Collar 0.422*** 0.111 -0.119 0.693*** 0.343*** -0.217* -0.038 -0.076 -0.025
(0.094) (0.075) (0.121) (0.099) (0.082) (0.128) (0.086) (0.077) (0.132)
Service 0.034 -0.019 -0.200 0.273** 0.142 -0.381** -0.271** -0.228** 0.141
(0.109) (0.088) (0.138) (0.117) (0.097) (0.184) (0.107) (0.096) (0.177)
Observations 2187 2125 861 2126 1811 623 2408 1919 621
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Kernel Densities 
By job type 
 
 
 
 
 
By size of firm 
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By region 
 
 
 
 
By Education Level  
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Table 11 
  
Year V0 V1 V1/V0 Hours Agui Soc ≥1 
2014 .062 .032 .512 .019 .071 .084 .142 
2013 .066 .034 .517 .126* .073 .085 .137* 
2012 .074 .035 .465 .134* .080 .097 .150* 
2011 .045 .023 .508 .114* .150 .101 .158* 
2010 .066 .029 .431 .169* .100 .117 .167* 
2009 .069 .028 .407 .179* .101 .128 .172* 
2008 
2007 
2005 
2002 
.058 
.063 
.047 
.028 
.024 
.024 
.014 
.008 
.423 
.382 
.309 
.306 
.192* 
.196* 
.166 
.166* 
.118 
.132 
.207 
.181 
.138 
.154 
.232 
.210 
.182* 
.199* 
.252* 
.236* 
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Table 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorization V0 V1 V1/V0 Hours Agui Soc ≥1 
 
Age        
 18 - 25 .112 .054 .482 .018 .130 .154 .237 
 25 - 40 .056 .029 .517 .017 .056 .066 .123 
 40 - 65  .046 .024 .522 .020 .051 .061 .111 
 65 + .129 .050 .388 .038 .279 .351 .378 
Gender         
 Female .068 .036 .529 .010 .058 .073 .129 
 Male .057 .029 .508 .027 .081 .093 .153 
Education        
 Primary – incomplete  .156 .068 .436 .059 .266 .298 .388 
 Primary 
 Liceo Basico  
 Liceo Tecnico 
 Liceo Segundario 
 Univ.  incomplete 
 University 
 Grad. incomplete 
 Graduate 
Residence upon birth 
 Current residence 
 Dif. residence in dep. 
 Dif. department  
 Dif. Country 
.095 
.066 
.043 
.030 
.035 
.016 
.009 
.009 
 
.064 
.071 
.052 
.066 
.046 
.035 
.026 
.017 
.020 
.010 
.004 
.006 
 
.033 
.036 
.028 
.034 
.484 
.530 
.605 
.567 
.571 
.625 
.444 
.667 
 
.516 
.507 
.538 
.515 
.029 
.017 
.008 
.011 
.007 
.009 
.018 
.015 
 
.018 
.027 
.018 
.034 
.120 
.062 
.031 
.024 
.038 
.013 
.015 
.015 
 
.072 
.093 
.056 
.099 
.144 
.078 
.033 
.027 
.041 
.012 
.015 
.008 
 
.086 
.108 
.067 
.107 
.221 
.141 
.082 
.065 
.082 
.041 
.042 
.039 
 
.144 
.168 
.123 
.186 
Ethnicity        
 Black .113 .055 .487 .028 .112 .135 .217 
 Asian .031 .015 .484 .000 .125 .031 .156 
 White  .060 .031 .517 .019 .068 .081 .138 
 Native .079 .037 .468 .025 .098 .117 .184 
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Table 13  
Categorization V0 V1 V1/V0 Hours Agu Soc ≥1 
Job Type        
 Private employers .078 .040 .512 .025 .091 .110 .181 
 Public employers .012 .007 .583 >.000 .000 .000 .012 
 Cooperative 
employment  
.066 .036 .545 .000 .253 .022 .286 
 Social program 
employ. 
.193 .071 .368 .000 .422 .048 .470 
 
Firm Size         
 1 person .214 .091 .425 .040 .322 .461 .500 
 2 to 4 people .134 .050 .373 .051 .292 .349 .424 
 5 to 9 people .074 .033 .446 .033 .135 .168 .236 
 10 to 19 people 
 20 to 49 people 
.068 
.067 
.024 
.037 
.353 
.522 
.029 
.021 
.071 
.041 
.078 
.040 
.157 
.121 
 50 or more people .039 .039 1 .007 .008 .008 .054 
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Table 14  
Categorization V0 V1 V0/V1 Hours Agui Soc ≥1 
Department        
 Montevideo 0.046 .026 .568 .014 .041 .051 .102 
 Artigas 0.115 .052 .446 .032 .153 .182 .244 
 Canelones  0.073 .040 .545 027 .074 .086 .159 
 Cerro Largo 
 Colonia 
 Durazno 
 Flores 
 Florida 
 Lavalleja 
 Maldonado 
 Paysandu 
 Rio Negro 
 Rivera 
 Rocha 
 Salto 
 San Jose 
 Soriano 
 Tacuarembo 
 Treinta y Tres 
0.072 
0.056 
0.073 
0.056 
0.073 
0.063 
0.066 
0.055 
0.074 
0.117 
0.069 
0.082 
0.073 
0.066 
0.091 
0.084 
.030 
.032 
.037 
.025 
.029 
.028 
.043 
.029 
.032 
.044 
.028 
.035 
.038 
.028 
.033 
.033 
.423 
.572 
.507 
.441 
.401 
.447 
.647 
.521 
.439 
.374 
.403 
.429 
.517 
.420 
.365 
.390 
.011 
.021 
.021 
.017 
.018 
.024 
.004 
.016 
.008 
.039 
.033 
.016 
.037 
.014 
.027 
.034 
.147 
.061 
.062 
.088 
.102 
.074 
.057 
.077 
.063 
.150 
.119 
.126 
.101 
.109 
.128 
.116 
.158 
.079 
.072 
.096 
.104 
.097 
.058 
.098 
.092 
.167 
.138 
.156 
.123 
.125 
.156 
.139 
.202 
.143 
.138 
.150 
.160 
.150 
.124 
.152 
.143 
.230 
.190 
.214 
.194 
.183 
.207 
.199 
Urban - Rural         
 Montevideo .046 .026 .568 .014 .041 051 .102 
 Urban – 5,000 + .072 .035 .490 .019 .085 .102 .161 
 Urban – 5,000 or less .080 .039 .486 .026 .120 .134 .206 
 Rural .085 .039 .458 .053 .122 .136 .220 
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Table 15 
  
Categorization V0 Hour
s 
Agui Soc Extra Vaca ≥1 ≥2 
(H) 
Firm Size          
 1 person .214 .091 .322 .461 .303 .410 .571 .436 
 2 to 4 people .134 .050 .292 .349 .255 .342 .502 .375 
 5 to 9 people .074 .033 .135 .168 .163 .166 .314 .190 
 10 to 19 people 
 20 to 49 people 
.068 
.067 
.024 
.037 
.071 
.041 
.078 
.040 
.133 
.107 
.096 
.054 
.243 
.196 
.109 
.069 
 50 or more people .039 .039 .008 .008 .044 .013 .090 .018 
Education         
 Primary – incomplete  .156 .059 .266 .298 .231 .299 .444 .332 
 Primary 
 Liceo Basico  
 Liceo Tecnico 
 Liceo Segundario 
 Univ. incomplete 
 University 
 Grad. incomplete 
 Graduate 
.095 
.066 
.043 
.030 
.035 
.016 
.009 
.009 
 
 
.029 
.017 
.008 
.011 
.007 
.009 
.018 
.015 
.120 
.062 
.031 
.024 
.038 
.013 
.015 
.015 
.144 
.078 
.033 
.027 
.041 
.012 
.015 
.008 
.131 
.093 
.033 
.069 
.090 
.074 
.081 
.096 
.149 
.077 
.035 
.036 
.050 
.019 
.024 
.017 
.274 
.194 
.097 
.115 
.154 
.105 
.102 
.119 
.165 
.091 
.039 
.042 
.053 
.026 
.042 
.031 
Urban - Rural          
 Montevideo .046 .014 .041 .051 .089 .056 .164 .065 
 Urban – 5,000 + .072 .019 .085 .102 .100 .103 .208 .116 
 Urban – 5,000 or less .080 .026 .120 .134 .124 .144 .256 .158 
 Rural .085 .053 .122 .136 .193 .148 .305 .185 
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Table 16  
Categorization Populatio
n 
Percentag
e 
H Percentag
e 
𝑀0
𝑎  𝑀0
𝑏  
Total 
Firm Size  
40529 100% .100 10.0% .071 .067 
 1 person 631 1.56 .436 6.8 .269 .239 
 2 to 4 people 4978 12.28 .375 45.8 .216 .172 
 5 to 9 people 4269 10.53 .190 20.0 .103 .079 
 10 to 19 people 
 20 to 49 people 
4202 
3619 
10.37 
8.93 
.109 
.069 
11.3 
6.2 
.057 
.034 
.044 
.027 
 50 or more people 22830 56.33 .018 10.0 .008 .006 
Education       
 Primary – incomplete  1344 3.32 .332 10.9 .199 .163 
 Primary 
 Liceo Basico  
 Liceo Tecnico 
 Liceo Segundario 
 Univ. incomplete 
 University 
 Graduate - incomplete 
 Graduate 
11059 
12568 
515 
7448 
4036 
2344 
332 
868 
27.30 
31.02 
1.27 
18.38 
9.96 
5.79 
0.82 
2.14 
.165 
.091 
.039 
.042 
.053 
.026 
.042 
.031 
44.9 
28.1 
0.5 
7.7 
5.3 
1.5 
0.3 
0.7 
.093 
.048 
.021 
.021 
.027 
.011 
.017 
.012 
.075 
.039 
.015 
.016 
.020 
.008 
.011 
.008 
Urban - Rural       
 Montevideo 17059 42.10 .065 27.10 .033 .025 
 Urban – 5,000 + 18789 46.36 .116 53.67 .065 .053 
 Urban – 5,000 or less 3021 7.45 .158 11.77 .089 .070 
 Rural 1651 4.07 .185 7.59 .103 .083 
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Table 17  
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Figure 4 
Figure 5  
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